Commentary

Flagrant Firepower: Israel’s Undermining of the Rules-Based Order

How Israeli attacks on Lebanon, Syria, and Iran distort the legal principle of self-defense and risk a more violent world

August 6, 2025

Israel has for generations flouted international law in its treatment of Palestinians, culminating in the current genocide charges it faces at the International Court of Justice. In tandem with its ongoing assault on Gaza, however, Israeli actions across the Middle East have shown a new willingness to disregard internationally accepted legal norms on a much wider scale, with repercussions that will reach far beyond the region.

In its recent attacks on Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, Israel has relied on increasingly broad interpretations of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This pattern reflects a shift toward the unilateral use of military force unconstrained by the legal limits governing such, known in international law as jus ad bellum. These developments matter not only for the region but for the international system as a whole. In an era when international standards and legal precedents are being increasingly undermined, Israel’s ongoing violations of the legal limits on force, if left unchallenged, risk accelerating the collapse of the rules-based order.

 

How Israel Usurps International Law

In June 2025, Israel launched a widespread, prolonged bombing campaign against Iran, striking nuclear facilities, military personnel, and scientists. The stated aim was to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon that might one day threaten Israel. However, international law does not permit force to prevent hypothetical future threats. Even under the broadest causal theory of anticipatory self-defense, a state must demonstrate both a fixed intent to attack and a narrow window in which action is necessary to prevent it. Israel presented no such evidence. With Washington and Tehran in diplomatic talks at the time, and United States intelligence services having previously assessed that Iran was not actively building a nuclear weapon, Israel’s attack was not a last-resort strike and was thus unlawful under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

Israel’s bombing campaign in Syria since December 2024 reflects similar legal overreach.

Following the fall of the Assad regime and the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to power in Damascus, Israel bombed hundreds of military sites in Syria, involving army, navy, and air force assets, weapon depots, and security and intelligence facilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the attacks as necessary to prevent jihadist groups from seizing advanced weapons. But again, no imminent threat to Israel was identified, nor was there evidence of a last window of opportunity. Under international law, Syria’s military assets remained protected despite regime change, as Article 2(4) safeguards the state, not its leadership. Israel’s military occupation of parts of southern Syria and ongoing ground operations in the area similarly lack United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization and apparent defensive necessity.

It is against this backdrop of increasingly expansive and preventive justifications that Israel’s actions in Lebanon must be examined, a case that is more legally complex. On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon entered into force. The agreement reaffirmed both parties’ commitment to fully implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, including the cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of non-state actors, namely Hezbollah.

Israel’s continued operations reflect an assertion of an open-ended right of self-defense; one that bypasses the established legal constraints of necessity, imminence, and proportionality.

Nonetheless, Israel resumed military operations in Lebanon within hours of the ceasefire taking effect. While Hezbollah did fire at Israel once after the ceasefire, this isolated incident does not amount to a sustained or coordinated attack that could reasonably justify Israel’s now eight-month, ongoing military campaign under a self-defense framework. The most direct legal justification for the use of force in response to an armed attack does not apply here. Nor can the broader causal theory of anticipatory self-defense apply: While the posturing of Hezbollah leaders has been belligerent, at no point has there been evidence presented that the group had irreversibly committed to attacking Israel, or reengage in hostilities, including when Israel was bombing Iran, Hezbollah’s patron. At no point since the ceasefire went into effect has Israel faced a last window of opportunity to act in self-defense. On the contrary, Israel’s continued operations reflect an assertion of an open-ended right of self-defense; one that bypasses the established legal constraints of necessity, imminence, and proportionality.

A more implicit justification has emerged that Israel is using force to pressure Lebanon into disarming Hezbollah, in line with the ceasefire agreement. This coercive enforcement logic is deeply problematic under international law. Enforcement of international obligations through force is impermissible absent UNSC authorization. While the US and United Kingdom once invoked Iraq’s failure to abide by the terms of the ceasefire to justify Operation Desert Fox in 1998, that case involved a prior Chapter VII resolution. Legal controversy still ensued, however, given that the US and UK acted without returning to the Security Council to obtain a renewed mandate. The enforcement of even Chapter VII obligations cannot be undertaken unilaterally. UNSCR 1701 is not a Chapter VII resolution, contains no use-of-force clause, and offers no mechanism for enforcement, snapback, or unilateral judgment of a breach. In legal terms, this places Israel’s actions in an even more precarious position. If Desert Fox was an unlawful stretch of enforcement logic, Israel’s strikes in Lebanon represent a leap beyond it.

The law is clear: absent an armed attack or Security Council mandate, Israel cannot lawfully use force.

Notably, Lebanon has not fully met its obligations under Resolution 1701. Hezbollah continues to operate as an armed group outside state control, and its disarmament remains a critical issue for both Lebanese sovereignty and regional stability. That said, since the ceasefire was agreed, there have been tangible signs of state action: As per the agreement, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have been deployed to southern Lebanon and dismantled numerous Hezbollah weapons caches and military positions. While the process is still incomplete, it reflects an effort by the Lebanese state to reassert authority and move toward compliance. As recently as August 5, Lebanon’s cabinet formally tasked the LAF with developing a plan by the end of August to bring all weapons under state control by year’s end, signaling renewed commitment to implementing Resolution 1701.

The prohibition on the use of force is not a flexible guideline. It is a foundational principle of the UN Charter and the collective security framework it upholds.

Nevertheless, Israel’s continued bombing suggests that its objectives may be less about compelling Lebanese compliance than unilaterally degrading Hezbollah’s military capacity to project dominance and expand its sphere of influence at a moment of regional flux. These sorts of geostrategic objectives are beyond legal justification. The law is clear: absent an armed attack or Security Council mandate, Israel cannot lawfully use force. Doing so not only violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter but also undermines the principle that enforcement of international obligations must be collective, not unilateral.

 

The Unraveling Fabric of the International Order

The prohibition on the use of force is not a flexible guideline. It is a foundational principle of the UN Charter and the collective security framework it upholds. While more powerful nations have always exercised leverage over less powerful ones, the rules-based order the UN Charter ushered in after World War II sought to deter disputes from descending into war by providing all nations with legal recourse against violations. In this context, it mandates that self-defense must be exercised within clearly defined legal limits and is not an open-ended license. Israel’s attacks around the region, presented as efforts to head off potential threats or enforce past commitments, call for a firm response from the UNSC and all signatories to the UN Charter. Taking such action would reinforce the authority and integrity of the rules‑based order.

Instead, most Western powers continue to sell Israel arms and frame that country’s actions as “Israel’s right to defend itself.” Western nations thereby make Israel an exception to the common understanding of jus ad bellum principles, rendering them meaningless through undermining their collective application. The consequences of such extend far beyond the Middle East, accelerating a global pattern in which unilateral use of force, as also seen in Russia’s assault on Ukraine, and elsewhere, erodes legal prohibitions intended to restrain the violent excesses of war. The world this entails will be more bloody and unstable for everyone.

 

Giselle Jetti is a Research Analyst at Badil | The Alternative Policy Institute 

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