The Lebanese government has political momentum behind its efforts to disarm Hezbollah and establish a state monopoly on arms; what it lacks is a workable plan.
This tension between the government’s aims and the reality it faces was highlighted this month when Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) searched and seized a vehicle full of explosives on its way to Beirut. Hezbollah officials admitted the shipment was theirs, intended for attacks against Israeli forces in South Lebanon, and demanded it be returned. Hezbollah member of Parliament Ibrahim Moussaoui said self-defense was the party’s natural right “as long as [Israeli] attacks continue, Israeli forces remain on Lebanese soil, and the government and military are unable to confront them.”
While Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and members of his cabinet vowed to prosecute those involved with the smuggling operation, they had no answer to Moussaoui’s underlying accusation: without Hezbollah, who will protect the country?
What has been missing, however, is a broader political vision for the transition, grounded in national dialogue, negotiated arrangements and credible guarantees.
The Lebanese government officially committed to bring all weapons under the control of the state in 2025, and followed up in March this year by banning Hezbollah’s military and security activities. What has been missing, however, is a broader political vision for the transition, grounded in national dialogue, negotiated arrangements and credible guarantees. This means agreeing not only on how Hezbollah’s military structures will be dismantled or integrated, but also on how the state will progressively assume the role of protecting Lebanon’s borders.
The Political Economy of Disarmament
Hezbollah’s disarmament, viewed narrowly as a weapons transfer, is also destined to fail. The party’s para-state roles extend well beyond its military capabilities, with networks of healthcare providers, social services, and financial institutions that have long filled gaps in state provision for historically marginalized Shia communities. The group’s military wing has served as a guardian of these broader social roles while also asserting itself in a core function of state sovereignty: protecting citizens from foreign enemies.
A durable transition would thus require phased decommissioning of Hezbollah’s military structures, alongside socioeconomic reintegration, institutional reform and national reconciliation. A credible agreement must be backed by public investment in reconstruction, social protection, healthcare, education, small business financing and vocational retraining, including economic opportunities for former combatants and others whose livelihoods depend on Hezbollah-linked institutions. Such investments are part of building the trust and material conditions necessary for disarmament to succeed.
The Northern Ireland peace process is instructive here: paramilitary decommissioning was tied to political agreement, policing reform and a wider implementation process, rather than treated as a self-contained operation.
But delivering on these commitments requires confronting Lebanon’s wider political economy. The World Bank projected a 6.4% contraction in GDP in 2026, while depositors continue to face restrictions on their savings and the banking sector remains in crisis. The government has boasted of achieving fiscal balance, but the costs have been borne by average citizens and involved the ruination of social protections. Without reinvestment in public services and post-war reconstruction, there will be insufficient confidence among Hezbollah’s constituency for any transition to proceed.
Economic recovery and stronger state institutions are not rewards to be granted after disarmament, but essential conditions for making the transition possible in the first place.
A credible transition therefore also demands banking-sector restructuring, an equitable distribution of losses from the country’s 2019 financial collapse, and fiscal reforms that confront the entrenched interests of Lebanon’s kleptocratic elites. Restoring state sovereignty ultimately requires rebuilding the state’s economic capacity and its ability to deliver for citizens.
International partners must thus stop dangling investment and trade as carrots for Hezbollah’s disarmament. Economic recovery and stronger state institutions are not rewards to be granted after disarmament, but essential conditions for making the transition possible in the first place.
A state monopoly over force will be difficult to sustain if communities are asked to relinquish an existing, if deeply contested, source of protection without believing the state can offer an alternative.
Building the State That Must Take Over
Crucially, the state must develop its own defense and security capabilities as Hezbollah’s are dismantled. The group’s longstanding justification for retaining its weapons is that it alone can guarantee Lebanon’s territorial integrity against external threats. A state monopoly over force will be difficult to sustain if communities are asked to relinquish an existing, if deeply contested, source of protection without believing the state can offer an alternative. This calls for a phased transition, in which the integration or dismantling of Hezbollah’s military structures proceeds alongside the development of state security capabilities. Progress on disarmament must be matched by the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) growing ability to assume territorial control and defensive responsibilities.
Security Sector Reform (SSR) must go beyond increasing the LAF manpower and providing additional equipment and training. A state-led security model must develop the capacity to deter foreign incursions and aggression. Given Israel’s overwhelming military superiority, Lebanon cannot realistically pursue military parity. Instead, a defense posture based on deterrence by denial would seek to make incursions more difficult and costly, reducing the prospects of rapid military gains and reinforcing the incentives for restraint. This requires the LAF to be equipped and trained to control its territory, maintain early warning and situational awareness, manage escalation, and ensure civil and institutional resilience. Delivering these functions requires clear doctrine, appropriate force structure, a division of labor between the LAF and other security agencies, civilian oversight and sustainable financing.
This vision of a ready army will not materialize without international support. With a new international donor conference expected in Paris in late 2026 or early 2027, and the European Union having established a mission to advise and train both the LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF), international partners have an opportunity to rethink their assistance. UNIFIL’s impending withdrawal also makes it essential to preserve independent third-party monitoring, verification and deconfliction mechanisms along the Blue Line.
International partners must recognize that Lebanese sovereignty has both domestic and external dimensions, and re-established state authority over both spheres is required for Hezbollah’s disarmament to succeed. Military assistance narrowly focused on enabling the LAF to police arms within the country without building its capacity to defend the borders will leave it unable to do either. Likewise, withholding reconstruction financing and economic investment until the disarmament is complete is the surest way to ensure it fails before it starts.
