Beyond Dualism: Building a State-Led Security Architecture for Lebanon

Foreword

Lebanon is losing territory while its political debate keeps going in circles. For or against Hezbollah’s weapons. Disarmament or resistance. Each camp invokes sovereignty, yet neither the persistence of an autonomous armed force nor demands to dismantle it have delivered a state capable of defending the country. Meanwhile, Israeli occupation and military operations continue, communities remain exposed, and the argument over arms deepens divisions that Lebanon can ill afford. There is a way out, but it requires a serious plan for the security that allows disarmament to become a reality.

Last year, BADIL argued that ending military dualism, the coexistence of two separate chains of military command, requires a negotiated transition linking Hezbollah’s disarmament and military integration to institutional reform, social protection and community trust. This policy paper takes that argument forward by setting out the defence capabilities the state must develop, the reforms needed to sustain them, as well as the time and money required. The ultimate objective is a state capable of assuming the defensive responsibilities and deterrent role that Hezbollah has claimed for itself.

This paper draws on months of research and consultations with public officials, members of the military apparatus, regional security specialists and public finance experts, alongside Lebanese military planning documents and international experience. Specialists informed its capability proposals and preliminary costing, while organizations working on security sector reform and disarmament reviewed its approach.

The price of this transition may sound formidable in a country exhausted by financial collapse and occupation, yet Lebanon has mobilized far greater sums to sustain systems that eventually failed its people: take the approximately $6.7 billion to Électricité du Liban between 2015 and 2019, or $4.18 billion paid out by the Banque du Liban in depositor repayments under its perverse circulars regime between 2021 and 2026. A deliberate investment in national defence deserves at least the same political commitment. Fairer taxation and accountable spending would also help build the domestic revenue needed to sustain it. International support can accelerate the transition, but Lebanon must take responsibility for financing its own security.

That commitment also requires confronting what the army is expected to do. The Lebanese Armed Forces cannot indefinitely carry the burden of public employment and social protection for its service members and their families, while also being asked to become an effective national defence force. Its structure, recruitment and spending must follow its military missions, with greater investment in specialists, technology, maintenance and readiness. Civilian institutions must progressively assume the welfare and policing responsibilities that draw the army away from those missions. Supporting the army means making these reforms possible.

This paper offers a substantive starting point: a model to debate, capabilities to assess, reforms to negotiate and costs to refine and fund. Sovereignty requires the means to defend it; national defence requires sovereign authority over its use.

This is the discussion Lebanon needs to have now. The region is being reshaped while we rehearse arguments that have kept us divided for decades. Neither louder declarations of sovereignty nor another round of accusations will build the institutions capable of protecting us. Lebanese leaders must make the choices, and international partners claiming to support Lebanese sovereignty must help make it viable.

This paper offers a substantive starting point: a model to debate, capabilities to assess, reforms to negotiate and costs to refine and fund. Sovereignty requires the means to defend it; national defence requires sovereign authority over its use. Unless we bring those responsibilities together and fund the means to exercise them, we will keep paying the price in conflicts with no end in sight.

Sami Halabi
Director of Policy
BADIL | The Alternative Policy Institute

Key findings

A capable army is a concomitant for disarmament. The state must be able to protect the communities that have looked to Hezbollah for security and absorb the patrols, route security, and surveillance UNIFIL has supported. Tasking the army with imposing disarmament first risks a domestic confrontation that could break its cohesion.
Lebanon’s defence should rest on denial and resilience. The army cannot match its neighbours’ conventional power, but it can make an incursion slower, costlier, and less certain of success.
The proposed model has four pillars:
1. Control of territory
2. Early warning and situational awareness
3. Escalation management
4. Civil and institutional resilience.
The army needs specialists more than recruits. Reform means right-sizing, civilianization, clearer security-sector responsibilities, and an end to using the army as a substitute for public employment or social protection.
The transition would take about five years, in three phases.
1. Phase I establishes state presence and authority.
2. Phase II builds operational control through surveillance, mobility, and logistics.
3. Phase III develops a limited capacity for defensive denial against invasion.
The additional cost is an estimated $2.54–3.41 billion over five years. International partners can help finance capital investment, but force design must be nationally defined and recurrent costs increasingly met from domestic revenue.
The transition must be politically led. It requires a negotiated agreement on the transfer of Hezbollah’s military responsibilities and a national security policy adopted by the Council of Ministers. The army should implement that settlement, not negotiate or impose it.
The transition cannot succeed without parallel diplomacy. Sustained army deployment requires Israeli withdrawal and an end to Israeli military operations. Once UNIFIL leaves, monitoring, verification, liaison, and deconfliction will need a third-party mechanism accepted by both Lebanon and Israel.

Introduction

If Hezbollah’s military capacity is removed faster than the state can replace the security functions it has performed, Lebanon risks exchanging dualism for a security vacuum

Lebanon’s central security problem is military dualism: the state formally claims sovereign authority over national defence but does not exercise exclusive control over the organized use of military force or decisions of war and peace. Ending that dualism requires Hezbollah’s disarmament, but disarmament alone will not produce effective sovereignty or defence. If Hezbollah’s military capacity is removed faster than the state can replace the security functions it has performed, Lebanon risks exchanging dualism for a security vacuum: gaps in territorial control and community protection, greater exposure to external threats and coercion, and renewed space for non-state armed actors to justify their narratives and rebuild their roles. A viable state-led security architecture must deter external threats and protect civilians while building the institutional capacity needed to make the state’s monopoly on force durable.

This paper proposes the development of a state-led security architecture. That architecture is centred on denial and resilience rather than military parity. Its proposals are intended to feed into a wider process where the state engages in meaningful Security Sector Reform (SSR) to build the credibility and capacity required to assume responsibility for national security, while Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups gradually enter a parallel process of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR).¹

The transition away from military dualism, and the disarmament of non-state actors it enables, is a multiyear effort, not a quick fix. It will require political, organizational, and institutional reform alongside progress on post-war reconstruction, domestic financing, and regional and international diplomacy. The final objective is a sustainable state-led security architecture that maintains the monopoly on force and narrows the gap between Lebanon’s formal sovereignty and its effective exercise.

The need for a roadmap for such a transition is all the more urgent at the time of writing this paper. On August 5, 2025, the Council of Ministers tasked the army with developing a plan to establish the state’s monopoly over arms.² The 2024 war and renewed conflict in 2026 have underscored both Lebanon’s continued exposure to external attack and the risks of escalation outside state command. UN Security Council Resolution 2790 extended UNIFIL’s mandate for a final time until December 31, 2026, to be followed by its withdrawal over the subsequent year, with the stated aim of making the Lebanese government the sole provider of security in southern Lebanon.³

This paper therefore assesses the functions and capabilities required for this new security architecture to develop and persist. It identifies the security responsibilities Lebanese institutions must assume, the constraints they face and the reforms and capabilities needed to address them, as well as the time and funds needed.

The analysis draws on Lebanese legal and policy documents, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) planning material, UN resolutions and reporting, defence expenditure data, as well as academic and policy research. It is supplemented by interviews and consultations with former Lebanese ministers of defence, former LAF generals, senior regional defence and security specialists, and Lebanese public finance experts, to name a few. Teams from two international organizations focused on SSR and DDR then reviewed the paper. Specialist technical input informed the proposed military capabilities and preliminary costing, including personnel, maintenance, logistics, and sustainment requirements.

This paper does not conduct a comprehensive national threat assessment, posit the intentions of neighbouring states, or prescribe a definitive force structure or procurement programme. Its capability priorities and cost estimates, constructed by security sector experts, remain indicative and require further operational assessment, comparison with alternatives, and detailed costing.

A more detailed analysis can be provided upon request to BADIL.

Nor does the paper prescribe the terms of a political settlement governing Hezbollah’s disarmament, prescribe a comprehensive DDR process, or resolve the diplomatic arrangements governing Lebanon’s relations with its neighbours. These decisions must emerge from a nationally led security policy and strategy-making process, complemented by international diplomacy.

I. The Case for a State-Led Security Architecture

LAF Capacity in a Politically Led Process

Discussions on restoring the Lebanese state’s monopoly over force have often narrowed that objective to Hezbollah’s disarmament, treating disarmament as the start of the process rather than part of a wider transfer of security capacity and responsibility to the state. Communities exposed to external insecurity remain reluctant to give up an existing source of protection without a credible state alternative, leaving Hezbollah’s rationale for autonomous armed capacity partly intact. Asking the LAF to try to impose disarmament before those concerns are addressed risks direct confrontation with domestic constituencies that would strain, and possibly break, the army’s institutional cohesion, not to mention raise the spectre of civil strife.

A capable LAF is therefore a concomitant of Hezbollah’s disarmament and establishing a state monopoly on force. The required state capacity also extends beyond the army: civilian security institutions must be able to take on policing and public order the army currently conducts, while functioning public services and reliable domestic financing are needed to sustain state authority where Hezbollah’s security role recedes.

Establishing a state monopoly over force therefore involves more than collecting weapons. It requires a sequenced political transition that, drawing on elements of both DDR and SSR, links military integration to state reform, social protection, and community trust. BADIL has previously argued that any transition away from Hezbollah’s autonomous armed role must combine phased military integration under the LAF with socioeconomic and institutional reform, so that communities reliant on Hezbollah’s protection and services do not experience the process as abandonment or defeat.⁴

The transition must therefore be politically led, with the government setting the framework, sequencing, and institutional guarantees through which military authority passes to the state. The Council of Ministers’ August 5 decision to task the army with developing a plan to establish the state’s monopoly over arms already provides a concrete governmental basis for forward action.⁵ The LAF must play a central role in implementation but should not be expected to negotiate or impose the political settlement on which the transition depends.

Existing Legal Mandate and Scope

The transition toward a state-led security architecture is already grounded in international law. The UN Charter affirms the sovereign equality of states and protects their territorial integrity and political independence. Lebanon is therefore entitled to build the capacity to defend its sovereignty, provided that capacity is used within the bounds of international law. UN Security Council Resolution 1559 also calls for disbanding and disarming Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and extending government authority throughout the country; while Resolution 1701 placed those commitments within a framework for a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution, including the principle that there be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the state.⁶

The same principle applies internally. The Taif Accord tied the extension of state sovereignty throughout Lebanon to the disbandment of militias and the transfer of their weapons to the state.⁷ The Accord also describes the non-military role of the army as a temporary, supportive measure after which “the armed forces shall return to their barracks.”

These elements establish the legal mandate for the transition but do not answer the practical question of what the Lebanese state must be capable of doing if exclusive authority over force is to be credible and durable. The answer must be guided by a nationally agreed security policy and strategy, which requires a political process for agreeing national security priorities, institutional responsibilities, and the conditions governing the use of force. The model proposed here is intended to inform that process.

II. What a State-Led Security Architecture Requires

2.1 A Realistic State-Led Deterrence Posture

Lebanon’s National Defence Law assigns the LAF three broad missions: defence, security, and development.⁸ The LAF’s official description of its mission emphasizes “constant readiness” against external attack and the protection of border towns and villages.⁹ Yet Lebanon cannot realistically match the conventional military capabilities of its more powerful neighbours. Both Israel and Syria have deployed forces on Lebanese territory within living memory, and Israel retains an overwhelming advantage in air power, surveillance, precision strike, and conventional firepower.

Faced with this imbalance, Lebanon’s focus in defending its territory, population, and institutions must be to discourage attacks. That is the purpose of deterrence: convincing a potential adversary that the costs and risks of military action outweigh the expected gains. With conventional parity out of reach, Lebanon’s deterrence model must rest on denial rather than punishment: making territorial gains harder, slowing or disrupting an incursion, preserving command and communications under attack, and retaining enough operational capacity that an adversary cannot expect a rapid or low-cost outcome.

Denial depends, in turn, on resilience. Forces that cannot communicate, manoeuvre, resupply, or keep operating after an initial attack cannot sustain a defensive posture for long. The same applies beyond the military: critical infrastructure, emergency services, and political institutions must remain functional if military pressure is not to result in wider state incapacitation. Resilience is therefore also central to deterrence itself.

Ukraine’s experience since the 2022 Russian invasion also shows the importance of human capital in asymmetric defence, requiring investment in military specialists, engineers, and technicians. A credible defensive posture therefore combines military systems with trained specialists, resilient communications, dispersed infrastructure, and the logistics to sustain operations under pressure.

Yet the effectiveness of Lebanon’s future deterrence posture will ultimately rest on capability, credibility, and communication¹⁰: usable defensive means, the political will and authority to employ them, and signalling clear enough to shape an adversary’s calculations.

Lebanon has historically lacked a settled defence doctrine defining priority threats, military missions, and the political conditions governing the use of force. The 2025 decision to establish exclusive state authority over arms settles who should exercise military authority, but not how it should be used. The LAF’s own 2023-2027 Capability Development Plan acknowledges that, without a national security or defence strategy, force development has had to proceed from the bottom up.¹¹

Developing meaningful LAF defensive capabilities must also address geopolitical and diplomatic constraints. The United States, the LAF’s largest military donor, is also a principal military backer of Israel, and US law requires arms transfers to other regional countries to be assessed against Israel’s qualitative military edge.¹² This creates a tension between international support for Lebanese state sovereignty and developing the defensive capabilities needed to protect it.

Lebanon’s procurement priorities will therefore need to follow nationally defined defence requirements rather than what external partners are prepared to supply. The choice should depend on operational suitability, cost, interoperability, and the ability to maintain and replenish equipment over time.

2.2 A National Security Policy and Political Process

Developing a national security policy and strategy is fundamentally political. It requires agreement on which threats Lebanon should prioritize, what responsibilities its security institutions should assume, and what resources the state is prepared to commit. The authority to adopt such a policy rests with the Council of Ministers: Articles 49 and 65 of the Constitution place the armed forces under its authority, and Article 6 of the National Defence Law states that “The Council of Ministers determines the general defence and security policy, sets its objectives, and supervises its implementation.”¹³

The Council of Ministers should therefore formally mandate the process and approve its outcome, with the president convening it in coordination with the prime minister, who is deputy chair of the Higher Defence Council under Article 64 of the Constitution. A designated interministerial mechanism should then bring together the relevant ministries, including Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance, with the LAF, the ISF, and other security institutions to assess national security needs and threats, review capabilities and resource constraints, and prepare policy options for the Cabinet. The Ministry of National Defence should coordinate the defence component, drawing on Army Command’s assessment of military missions, force structure, and capability requirements.

Broad consultations should also involve Parliament, political parties, local authorities, independent experts, civil society, and the communities most affected by insecurity. This inclusive process would address national security priorities and the institutional guarantees and political conditions under which security responsibilities would transfer to the state, building the consent and consensus needed to implement decisions.

The resulting policy and strategy would then be able to inform military doctrine, security-sector development plans, capability requirements, procurement, and multiyear budgeting. Under Article 8 of the National Defence Law, the Higher Defence Council is responsible for determining measures to implement Cabinet-defined policy, allocating responsibilities among ministries and relevant institutions, and approving the corresponding personnel and equipment plans; its General Secretariat could support technical preparation and follow-up under Article 10. Parliament would exercise its legislative and budgetary responsibilities, and international partners could provide technical assistance without displacing Lebanese political leadership.

2.3 The Four-Pillar Model

This paper now translates the deterrence posture and national security policy outlined above into a model organized around four mutually reinforcing pillars: control of territory; early warning and situational awareness; escalation management; and civil and institutional resilience.

These pillars are mutually dependent: territorial control requires reliable situational awareness; early warning must inform timely decisions to manage escalation; and these functions depend on military and civilian institutions remaining operational under pressure.

2.3.1 Pillar 1: Control of Territory

Control of territory means that the state can prevent Lebanese territory from being used for unauthorized military activity while retaining the capacity to contest incursions and enforce its authority. This requires more than the physical presence of troops. Forces must be able to monitor their areas of responsibility, move between sectors, reinforce positions when challenged, and keep operating under pressure.

The LAF already maintains a broad territorial footprint, but its posture remains relatively static. The principal weaknesses identified in the existing force are mobility, rapid-response capacity, combat engineering, and the protection of military positions. These gaps matter most in the South, where checkpoints and permanent deployments establish presence but cannot by themselves defend the area or react quickly to an incursion.

The LAF should therefore move toward lighter, more mobile formations, supported by protected transport, rapid-response units, and combat-engineering and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity. This shift is consistent with reported Army Command thinking: fewer brigades, more regiments, lighter vehicles, reduced manpower, and greater reliance on technology.¹⁴ The UK-supported Land Border Regiments developed amid the fight with ISIS offer a useful precedent, both for combining permanent positions, surveillance, and mobile patrols, and for organizing sustained international assistance around a clearly defined LAF mission.¹⁵ Territorial defence against a military incursion, however, requires more protection and manoeuvre capacity than border policing.

Permanent positions in exposed areas should also be hardened and dispersed, with enough communications, logistics, and engineering support to remain operational if attacked. A nationally vetted territorial reserve or auxiliary model could also complement regular forces in specific areas through support to observation, civil defence, and local liaison. It would require an unambiguous LAF chain of command and tightly defined functions.

2.3.2 Pillar 2: Early Warning and Situational Awareness

Early warning and situational awareness provide the independent intelligence and operational picture needed to detect threats, anticipate escalation, and support timely decisions. Control of territory depends on knowing what is happening across it, while denying an adversary the advantage of surprise.

The LAF currently lacks an integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture capable of producing a continuous picture across land, air, and maritime domains and passing it directly to commanders and responding forces. Gaps include sensor coverage, secure communications, data fusion, and interoperability. Air and low-altitude surveillance remain particularly weak, including against drones, while maritime awareness still benefits from UNIFIL support.

The priority should therefore be an integrated national C4ISR system, not an accumulation of standalone radars, drones, or communications equipment: ground sensors, aerial surveillance, tactical unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), coastal radar, and other sources should feed secure networks and fusion centres that create a common operational picture, with detection linked to verification, decision, and response. The architecture should be designed for long-term operation and maintenance by Lebanese institutions, drawing on domestic technical expertise, with safeguards for data security and institutional oversight.

Air and low-altitude coverage require particular attention, combining radar, electro-optical and infrared sensors, and UAS with a counter-UAS chain able to detect, identify, and respond to hostile drones.¹⁶).¹⁷

2.3.3 Pillar 3: Escalation Management

Escalation management keeps decisions bearing on war and peace within the state’s political and military chain of command, while providing mechanisms to contain incidents before they widen. It is as much an institutional requirement as a military capability.

Preventing escalation requires clear political authority over military responses and agreed rules of engagement linking political authorities, Army Command, and deployed units. The LAF must be able to respond to incidents within those rules, while the government retains control over decisions that could widen a confrontation.

Escalation management also requires channels outside the national chain of command. UNIFIL has provided liaison, deconfliction, and communication mechanisms whose usefulness derives partly from their third-party character. Its withdrawal should be accompanied by an agreed successor arrangement that maintains direct or indirect communication, impartial monitoring, and deconfliction between Lebanon and Israel.¹⁸

If deterrence and crisis management fail, the LAF must be able to withstand an initial attack and keep operating under unified state command. That requires protected and dispersed positions, redundant communications, mobile forces, and enough logistical reserves to sustain operations despite damage to military infrastructure. Integrated defensive capabilities would let Lebanese forces contest incursions, impose continuing costs, and deny an adversary a rapid or uncontested advance. By preserving the LAF’s ability to operate under attack, they would also give political authorities more control over the course of a confrontation, rather than leaving them few military options once hostilities begin.

Finally, escalation management requires communication as much as capability. Lebanon should make clear that its military posture is defensive, that decisions on the use of force rest with state authorities, and that incursions will meet an organized military response. Public statements of doctrine should be backed by diplomatic communication and functioning crisis-management channels, without disclosing operational plans or committing the government to rigid responses. Military preparedness and diplomacy should reinforce each other: stronger defensive capacity is meant to create more space for restraint and crisis management, not to replace them.

2.3.4 Pillar 4: Civil and Institutional Resilience

Civil and institutional resilience allows the military and the wider state to keep functioning under pressure and makes it harder for external coercion to turn military pressure into political paralysis. Resilience begins with military survivability but extends to the institutions, infrastructure, and communities on which defence ultimately depends.

The LAF’s ability to keep its forces supplied and its equipment operational is one of its most serious constraints. Maintenance capacity, warehousing, spare parts, fuel, ammunition stocks, and technical personnel remain limited, and more sophisticated capabilities would increase those requirements. New equipment that cannot be staffed, maintained, or supplied adds to the inventory without necessarily adding usable military power. Capability development should therefore be matched from the outset by investment in maintenance, logistics, and operational reserves deep enough for the force to keep operating beyond the opening stages of a crisis, with priority command facilities, communications, and logistics sites hardened and dispersed and redundancy built into networks and supply chains.

The LAF remains heavily manpower- and rank-intensive. It numbers around 80,000 personnel, including roughly 500 generals.¹⁹ An estimated 22% of uniformed personnel may perform administrative functions that could be civilianized²⁰, and recent analysis points to an ageing officer corps, stalled promotion cycles, and the loss of technical personnel.²¹ Yet the government continues to pursue expansion: in August 2026, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam reaffirmed plans to enlarge the LAF’s ranks, and Army Command launched recruitment campaigns for officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) cadets during the year.²²

Modernization should instead prioritize a more specialized, technically capable force rather than treat recruitment alone as the answer to operational shortcomings. A mission-based review of personnel requirements across territorial deployment, mobile formations, technical and logistical support, and command and administrative functions should determine where recruitment or reductions are warranted.

Senior-rank and promotion structures should also be rationalized, suitable administrative functions progressively civilianized, and recruitment, training, and retention concentrated on identified technical and operational shortages. Any reduction in personnel should be gradual and accompanied by voluntary early retirement, protected pensions, retraining, and employment-transition support, designed and costed from the outset to protect affected personnel and preserve the army’s institutional cohesion.

Lebanon’s universities produce engineering and IT talent, but sustained emigration has made skilled personnel hard for domestic institutions, including the LAF, to retain. Competitive pay, direct entry for qualified graduates, and stronger technical NCO career paths could help the army attract and keep that expertise. Partnerships with universities, technical institutes, and Lebanese firms could also strengthen its capacity to maintain and adapt military systems locally rather than rely indefinitely on external contractors.

Ultimately, the LAF must stop serving as a substitute for public employment and broader social-protection policy. Adequate salaries, pensions, and benefits remain essential to welfare and retention, but force size should reflect defence requirements, not the state’s need to provide jobs or social support; civilian institutions should progressively take on those functions.

At the same time, the LAF’s institutional cohesion is itself an asset the transition must preserve: political sequencing must account for the army’s cross-confessional composition and avoid imposing responsibilities that could reproduce Lebanon’s political divisions within the military. Any personnel restructuring will need to account for the delicate confessional balance already maintained within the army, at least in the short term. That said, all future recruitment should be based on merit and mission-based applicability to this model, rather than confessional considerations.

The army’s defence role cannot expand indefinitely while it compensates for weaknesses elsewhere in the state. Rebuilding the capacity and public credibility of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), General Security, and other civilian institutions should allow routine policing and public order to shift progressively away from the LAF, freeing military personnel for training, readiness, and territorial defence.

Institutional resilience also depends on predictable domestic financing: reliance on donor support for salaries, fuel, and maintenance leaves essential security functions vulnerable to external decisions. International funding always comes with strings attached, whether explicit or implicit. As such, the financial infrastructure required to fund home-grown capacity will need to replace donor reliance: something which will require an overhaul of Lebanon’s taxation system and, in part, its social contract.²³

Finally, resilience extends beyond the armed forces. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capacity — including heavy rescue and lifting equipment, mobile medical units, and emergency logistics — alongside shelters, continuity planning, and protection of critical infrastructure can reduce the human and institutional toll of military pressure. Where state authority is expanding, reconstruction, public services, and functioning civilian institutions should accompany military deployment; the architecture will be more durable where communities experience the state as able to protect and sustain civilian life.

III. Building State-Led Security: A Phased Roadmap

The transition from military dualism to state-led defence and deterrence should be phased by function and capability, not by a fixed timetable. Even under favourable conditions, it will take an estimated five years for all security functions to move to the state as Lebanese institutions acquire the capabilities, financing, and political authority to exercise them credibly.

The timeframes below are therefore indicative: consistent with the LAF’s phased approach to restricting arms outside the state apparatus, the timeline will depend on meeting each phase’s operational and political requirements, remaining adaptable to renewed Israeli military operations, facilitating domestic discussions over the DDR process, as well as managing any renewed economic instability or disrupted external support.

Territorial presence, patrols, route security, EOD, and response to limited incidents can be assumed first; more demanding functions such as integrated surveillance, command and control, maritime monitoring, and defensive denial require deeper institutional and material capacity. By replacing functions performed outside the state with credible state alternatives, each phase should progressively reduce the practical security rationale for military dualism.

The transition will also depend on sustained political backing, institutional legitimacy, local acceptance, and a negotiated political agreement governing the transfer of Hezbollah’s military responsibilities to the state. That agreement should set the terms and sequencing of disarmament, the status of personnel and capabilities now outside state command, and the guarantees required for political and community acceptance. Without it, the LAF risks being tasked with enforcing a transition that lacks the political conditions for its implementation.

A parallel regional and international diplomatic track is also needed to secure the conditions for sustained LAF deployment, particularly the cessation of Israeli military operations and withdrawal from occupied Lebanese positions, not least to preserve monitoring, liaison, and deconfliction arrangements as UNIFIL withdraws. Because international partners differ in their priorities and willingness to support particular capabilities, and their preferred arrangements may not match the Lebanese government’s, the transition will require nationally led coordination and sustained negotiation, not reliance on a presumed international consensus.

The roadmap shows how the proposed reforms can be sequenced over time. Each phase sets out its time horizon, central objective, benchmarks for assessing progress, and the priorities to advance it. The benchmarks indicate whether the phase is on track and the conditions are in place to move forward. Some measures will need to begin early and continue across phases, while others will depend on progress in building institutional capacity, securing resources, and reaching political agreement.

3.1 Phase I — Establish State Presence and Authority | 0-12 Months

The first phase focuses on making state authority visible and effective in practice. Its benchmarks should capture whether the institutions responsible for security are better able to operate consistently, coordinate their roles, and extend state presence across the country. The priorities below set out the initial steps toward that progress and prepare for the more substantial reforms that follow.

Priorities should include:

Initiate national security policy and strategy-making. Reaffirm exclusive state authority over decisions of war and peace, and launch the nationally led policy and strategy process set out above.
Consolidate territorial control. Strengthen permanent presence along key routes and in population centres and sensitive areas, supported by sustained patrols, observation, rapid-response forces, and combat-engineering and EOD capacity, to prevent the reconstitution of unauthorized launch sites, weapons storage, or other military infrastructure outside state control.
Make deployment sustainable. Give forces the mobility, supply, maintenance, communications, and infrastructure to remain deployed continuously rather than rely on episodic reinforcement.
Strengthen local legitimacy and civilian state presence. Accompany military deployment with reconstruction, public services, social protection, economic recovery, and functioning civilian institutions, particularly in damaged or depopulated areas.
Rebalance responsibilities across the security sector. Rebuild and professionalize the ISF and other civilian institutions so that policing and routine public order can shift away from the LAF.
Launch personnel reform and specialist workforce development. Develop a mission-based manpower plan, progressively civilianize suitable administrative positions, rationalize senior ranks and promotion pathways, and redirect recruitment toward technical specialists, NCOs, and others needed to operate and sustain C4ISR, unmanned systems, and other priority capabilities.
Establish a defence financing baseline. Review current personnel and operating expenditure, cost the initial institutional reforms, and agree a medium-term financing plan identifying domestic budget commitments and requirements for external assistance.
Prepare the post-UNIFIL transition. Prioritize transferring ground patrols, route security, and EOD to Lebanese institutions first before seconding these functions to any bilateral agreement or force currently being discussed. This principle should also be followed for national surveillance and maritime security as capabilities develop. In addition, the principle should also govern any external or mutually accepted mechanism for monitoring, verification, liaison, and deconfliction, and preserve trusted humanitarian notification and access arrangements.
Set the rules for any later integration process. Establish from the outset that any future incorporation of non-state personnel or capabilities into state structures, to be implemented in later phases, will be governed by a single chain of command and exclusive state authority over the use of force. Negotiated interim measures, including a verified weapons inventory and secure storage pending collection or disposal, could also be considered, provided they prevent independent military use and have a defined endpoint. Civilian reintegration should remain an option for personnel not incorporated into state institutions.

Phase I benchmark: The state can maintain a continuous, sustainable, and locally accepted security presence, respond to routine incidents, and prevent the re-emergence of autonomous military activity in areas brought under its control.

3.2 Phase II — Build Operational Control and Defensive Capacity | 1-3 Years

The second phase builds on the state presence established in Phase I, focusing on the capabilities needed to monitor developments, reinforce deployments, and sustain state control over time.

Priorities should include:

Integrated C4ISR: connect ground, aerial, and maritime surveillance to secure communications, operations centres, and responding units to create a common operational picture.
Mobility and rapid response: develop lighter and more mobile formations, specialized forces, protected transport, and engineering capacity able to reinforce threatened sectors quickly.
Logistics and readiness: expand domestic maintenance facilities, spare-parts and ammunition stocks, fuel reserves, warehousing, and technical personnel.
Protected infrastructure: harden priority command posts, logistics sites, and communications infrastructure, and introduce greater redundancy and dispersion.
Initial defensive-denial capabilities: establish counter-UAS protection and develop maritime surveillance and patrol capabilities, while preparing for the introduction of layered air-defence and anti-armour systems in Phase III, according to assessed requirements rather than predetermined platforms.

Capability development should remain resource-constrained. Scarce resources should go to capabilities the LAF can operate and sustain, and procurement should proceed only where funding is secured for the personnel, maintenance, and recurrent operating costs needed to keep them operational.

In parallel, the government should prepare the procedures needed to implement any negotiated integration or demobilization process, including eligibility criteria, institutional safeguards and civilian reintegration arrangements.

Phase II benchmark: The LAF can independently maintain situational awareness across priority areas, communicate securely, reinforce forces in response to threats, and sustain operations without depending on external actors for core surveillance or command functions.

3.3 Phase III — Establish Credible Defensive Denial | 3-5 Years

The third phase turns territorial control into a more credible defence and deterrence posture. The objective is not conventional parity with Israel but enough survivability, defensive depth, and firepower to keep the LAF from being rapidly suppressed and to make incursions progressively harder, slower, and more costly.

Defensive denial need not depend exclusively on expensive, imported military systems. Investment in specialized personnel and domestic technical capacity could also enable the LAF to develop and sustain lower-cost asymmetric capabilities, including unmanned systems drawing on commercial off-the-shelf technologies and additive manufacturing. Such capabilities could complement conventional defensive systems while reducing dependence on external suppliers for maintenance, adaptation, and replenishment.

This requires:

Layered territorial defence, making use of terrain, prepared positions, and defensive depth rather than relying solely on exposed fixed deployments.
Hardened and dispersed military infrastructure, including protected command facilities, logistics sites, and redundant communications.
Mobile and specialized forces able to operate between defensive positions and respond flexibly to incursions while remaining under central political and military authority.
Layered air-defence and anti-armour capabilities, integrated into the counter-UAS surveillance and command architecture developed in Phase II.
Deeper operational reserves, including ammunition, fuel, replacement equipment, and trained technical personnel.
Civil resilience and HADR capacity, including shelters, emergency medical capacity, continuity planning, and protected civilian infrastructure in exposed areas.
Clear state signalling, so that defensive capabilities, political authority, and the circumstances governing their use are understood externally.
Predictable domestic funding for operational readiness, maintenance, replenishment, and the specialized personnel needed to sustain the force.

By this stage, any transitional arrangements involving non-state military personnel or capabilities should have a clear endpoint. Lebanon should also have made the strategic choices needed to build a credible national defence capability, particularly in air defence, where the LAF currently has no meaningful capacity. This requires a realistic assessment of potential suppliers, the systems they may be willing to provide, and the technologies Lebanon could develop or sustain domestically. The United States will remain an important partner in the short term. However, uncertainty over continued US support for the LAF, an expanding European defence sector, and an increasing range of alternative international suppliers all provide an important impetus for the Lebanese government to evaluate its procurement pathways.

Phase III benchmark: The state is positioned to survive an initial attack, preserve command and logistics, contest an incursion, and impose enough delay, uncertainty, and material cost that an adversary cannot expect a rapid or low-cost outcome.

3.4 Political, Organizational, and Institutional Reforms

Organizational and political reform must advance alongside capability development throughout the transition. The table below sets out how these reforms progress across the three phases.

IV. Costing and Financing the Transition

A preliminary costing of the capability packages identified here places the additional five-year financing requirement at approximately $2.54-3.41 billion above the LAF’s existing baseline expenditure. For comparison, Lebanon’s 2026 budget allocated LBP 101.7 trillion (approximately $1.14 billion) to the Ministry of National Defence.²⁴

The financing estimate for the transition excludes existing salaries, pensions, and baseline recurrent expenditure, as well as wider reconstruction costs, but includes the additional personnel, training, and sustainment costs the transition requires. These estimates are indicative and provide an initial investment framework, to be refined through detailed operational assessments, comparison of alternative systems, and verification of procurement and lifecycle costs.

A more detailed version of the following cost estimate can be requested from info@thebadil.com

Costs rise substantially across the three phases. Phase I mainly funds sustained state presence, but it also includes substantial investment in specialist recruitment and training, reflecting the importance of human capital to the transition’s long-term sustainability. Phase II adds more complex networked capabilities. Phase III carries the largest increase because credible defensive denial requires costly air-defence and anti-armour capabilities, fortified and dispersed infrastructure, specialized mobile forces, and deeper operational reserves.

This investment is substantial, but Lebanese public institutions have mobilized comparable resources before. Between 2015 and 2019, government transfers to Électricité du Liban totalled approximately $6.7 billion.²⁵Between July 2021 and March 2026, Banque du Liban alone financed $4.18 billion in depositor repayments under Circulars 158 and 166.²⁶ The draft Financial Gap Law envisages around $20 billion in repayments over four years for deposits of up to $100,000.²⁷These commitments rely on different financing mechanisms, but they put the proposed defence investment in perspective. Credible national defence capabilities will require a similarly deliberate, multiyear financing commitment rather than continued dependence on the equipment and funding external partners are prepared to provide.

Financing should distinguish between capital investment and long-term sustainment. Capability development and procurement should be guided by three interrelated priorities: resilience, human capital, and survivability. This means investing not only in equipment but in the specialized personnel, protected infrastructure, and logistics needed to maintain and adapt military capabilities under pressure. Procurement should also account for operational depth: ammunition stocks, spare parts, trained personnel, replacement equipment, and credible replenishment pathways determine whether a capability remains usable in sustained conflict. Lebanon should therefore adopt multiyear defence planning, coordinate external assistance around its nationally defined capability plan, and progressively increase the domestic share of recurrent and lifecycle costs.

In 2025, around 76% of army expenditure went to personnel costs, while capital expenditure accounted for less than 2% and equipment for just 0.4%.²⁸ By comparison, personnel expenditure, including pensions, accounted for around 39% of France’s defence budget in 2025.²⁹ Personnel reform must therefore reconcile two objectives: improving real compensation to retain skilled personnel while progressively reducing salaries and benefits to around half of total defence spending or less. This should come from right-sizing and a larger non-personnel envelope, not wage compression.

The government should therefore adopt a medium-term defence financing plan alongside the capability roadmap, specifying which expenditures domestic revenues will cover, which acquisitions will require external assistance, and how recurring costs will be met as donor support declines. This will require stronger tax administration and a broader, fairer revenue base, alongside reforms to personnel expenditure, procurement, and budget oversight. International assistance can accelerate the transition, but the Lebanese state must progressively assume responsibility for sustaining the capabilities it acquires. The capacity to finance defence, as well as reconstruction and social protection, through credible public institutions is itself part of sovereign capacity.

V. Conclusion

The financing outlined above turns Lebanon’s security debate into decisions the government can begin taking now. Costs need refinement, capabilities require assessment and political arrangements must be negotiated. But there is sufficient groundwork to assign responsibilities, commit resources and begin implementation.

The next year and a half, leading to the next parliamentary elections, offers a concrete window to establish foundations that a successor government can build on: a national security policy, a multiyear financing plan, initial army reforms and investments in operational readiness. Alongside these measures, the government must advance a political agreement governing the transfer of Hezbollah’s military responsibilities to the state.

The cost of building credible national defence can be assessed, debated and funded. The cost of continued delay will keep being paid in lives, displacement and destruction.

Progress must also reach the communities being asked to place their security in state hands, through reconstruction, public services and social protection. Diplomacy must pursue Israeli withdrawal and an end to military operations, while preparing for UNIFIL’s departure. International assistance should support a Lebanese plan that the state can progressively finance and sustain.

By the elections, the government should be judged on whether it has put a funded, politically supported transition into motion. The region will not wait for Lebanon to settle its arguments. The cost of building credible national defence can be assessed, debated and funded. The cost of continued delay will keep being paid in lives, displacement and destruction.

Editor’s Note: BADIL would like to thank the many researchers, experts, officials and officers who helped compile this policy paper. BADIL would like to express its heartfelt gratitude to Giselle Jetti for her valuable research contributions to this paper as well as KI Insights for their technical insight.

The Lebanese Armed Forces declined a request to contribute to this report.

Footnotesالهوامش

1
Halabi, Sami, and Giselle Jetti. “No Peace Without Process: Changing Course on Hezbollah’s Arms.” The Alternative Policy Institute (BADIL), April 17, 2025. https://thebadil.com/policy/policy-papers/no-peace-without-process-changing-course-on-hezbollahs-arms/. ↩︎
2
Maya Gebeily and Laila Bassam, “Lebanon Tasks Army with Limiting Arms to State Forces in Challenge to Hezbollah,” Reuters, August 5, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-tasks-army-with-limiting-arms-state-forces-challenge-hezbollah-2025-08-05/. ↩︎
3
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2790 (2025), S/RES/2790 (2025), August 28, 2025, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4087501 ↩︎
4
Halabi, Sami, and Giselle Jetti. “No Peace Without Process: Changing Course on Hezbollah’s Arms.” The Alternative Policy Institute (BADIL), April 17, 2025. https://thebadil.com/policy/policy-papers/no-peace-without-process-changing-course-on-hezbollahs-arms/. ↩︎
5
Maya Gebeily and Laila Bassam, “Lebanon Tasks Army with Limiting Arms to State Forces in Challenge to Hezbollah,” Reuters, August 5, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-tasks-army-with-limiting-arms-state-forces-challenge-hezbollah-2025-08-05/. ↩︎
6
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1559 (2004), S/RES/1559 (2004), September 2, 2004, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/529421; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1701 (2006), S/RES/1701 (2006), August 11, 2006, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/581053. ↩︎
7
Republic of Lebanon, “The Taif Agreement,” approved November 4, 1989, United Nations, https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf. ↩︎
8
Republic of Lebanon, National Defence Law, Legislative Decree No. 102 of September 16, 1983, as amended, https://www.mod.gov.lb/sites/default/files/2019-08/قانون-الدفاع-الوطني.pdf. ↩︎
9
Lebanese Armed Forces, “The Mission of the Lebanese Army,” https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/mission-lebanese-army ↩︎
10
NATO Allied Command Transformation, “What Is Deterrence?,” NATO, https://www.act.nato.int/activities/deterrence/ ↩︎
11
Lebanese Armed Forces, “Army Capabilities Development,” https://lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/army-capabilities-development. ↩︎
12
United States, Arms Export Control Act, § 36(h), 22 U.S.C. § 2776(h), https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-120/t22/s2776/. ↩︎
13
Republic of Lebanon, Constitution of the Lebanese Republic, arts. 49 and 65, https://www.lp.gov.lb/backoffice/uploads/files/Lebanese%20%20Constitution-%20En.pdf; Republic of Lebanon, National Defence Law, Legislative Decree No. 102 of September 16, 1983, art. 6, https://www.mod.gov.lb/sites/default/files/2019-08/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A.pdf. ↩︎
14
Nayla Moussa, “Lebanon’s Army in Limbo: History, Constraints and Uncertain Futures,” Arab Reform Initiative, August 6, 2026, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/lebanons-army-in-limbo-history-constraints-and-uncertain-futures/. ↩︎
15
British Embassy Beirut, “UK Reaffirms Support for Lebanese Armed Forces,” January 22, 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-reaffirms-support-for-lebanese-armed-forces. ↩︎
16
Interview conducted with a security expert for this study ↩︎
17
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), “UNIFIL Naval Peacekeepers Help Lebanese Navy Take on Maritime Security Duties,” June 17, 2026 https://unifil.unmissions.org/en/news/unifil-naval-peacekeepers-help-lebanese-navy-take-on-maritime-security-duties ↩︎
18
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), “UNIFIL Remains a Critical Stabilizing Factor in South Lebanon,” October 1, 2026. https://unifil.unmissions.org/en/news/unifil-remains-a-critical-stabilizing-factor-in-south-lebanon ↩︎
19
Nemtala Eddé, “Membres, équipements, histoire : ce qu’il faut savoir sur l’armée libanaise,” L’Orient-Le Jour, March 11, 2026, https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1498286/membres-equipements-histoire-ce-quil-faut-savoir-sur-larmee-libanaise-.htm ↩︎
20
Interview with a former Lebanese minister of defence, conducted for this research ↩︎
21
Nayla Moussa, “Lebanon’s Army in Limbo: History, Constraints and Uncertain Futures,” Arab Reform Initiative, August 6, 2026, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/lebanons-army-in-limbo-history-constraints-and-uncertain-futures/. ↩︎
22
LBCI, “PM Salam on Army Day: One Army for One People in One Homeland,” August 1, 2026, https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/lebanon-news/950099/lbci-lebanon-articles/en ↩︎
23
Ray, Alex. “Rock Bottom: The Tax Reforms Lebanon Has to Have.” The Alternative Policy Institute (BADIL), December 23, 2022. https://thebadil.com/policy/policy-papers/rock-bottom-tax-reforms-lebanon/. ↩︎
24
Republic of Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Citizen Budget 2026, April 14, 2026, https://finance.gov.lb/en-us/Finance/BI/ABDP/Annual%20Budget%20Documents%20and%20Process/Citizen%20Budget%202026-Apr26-En-final.pdf ↩︎
25
Toufic Gaspard, Banque du Liban: A Forensic Analysis (Beirut: Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, February 2024), 14, table 2, https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/Banque-Du-Liban-A-Forensic-Analysis.pdf ↩︎
26
Banque du Liban, “Statement on Basic Circulars No. 158 and No. 166” [in Arabic], May 11, 2026, https://www.bdl.gov.lb/pressrelease1.php?pressid=11733. ↩︎
27
Michael Young, “Unpacking Lebanon’s Gap Law,” interview with Ishac Diwan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 7, 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2026/01/unpacking-lebanons-gap-law. ↩︎
28
Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan, “Lebanon Citizen Budget Dashboard,” Ministry of Finance, accessed November 11, 2026, https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiYjZhYmIwODYtN2NhNy00Njc5LWIxZGItZjg2Y2YwYWU4ODlhIiwidCI6IjYwMDc3ZDE0LTliYzAtNGE0My1hNWE5LTQ1N2E5ZTcxMGQ2YSIsImMiOjl9. ↩︎
29
French Senate, Projet de loi de finances pour 2025 : Défense, November 21, 2024, https://www.senat.fr/rap/l24-144-39/l24-144-39_mono.html. ↩︎

Beyond Dualism: Building a State-Led Security Architecture for Lebanon

Nizar Ghanem

Sami Halabi

Victor Masson

Read More

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About us

Beyond Dualism: Building a State-Led Security Architecture for Lebanon

Beyond Dualism: Building a State-Led Security Architecture for Lebanon

Foreword

Key findings

Introduction

I. The Case for a State-Led Security Architecture

LAF Capacity in a Politically Led Process

Existing Legal Mandate and Scope

II. What a State-Led Security Architecture Requires

2.1 A Realistic State-Led Deterrence Posture

2.2 A National Security Policy and Political Process

2.3 The Four-Pillar Model

2.3.1 Pillar 1: Control of Territory

2.3.2 Pillar 2: Early Warning and Situational Awareness

2.3.3 Pillar 3: Escalation Management

2.3.4 Pillar 4: Civil and Institutional Resilience

III. Building State-Led Security: A Phased Roadmap

3.1 Phase I — Establish State Presence and Authority | 0-12 Months

3.2 Phase II — Build Operational Control and Defensive Capacity | 1-3 Years

3.3 Phase III — Establish Credible Defensive Denial | 3-5 Years

3.4 Political, Organizational, and Institutional Reforms

IV. Costing and Financing the Transition

V. Conclusion

Footnotesالهوامش

Nizar Ghanem

Sami Halabi

Victor Masson

Read More

قراءة المزيد

Related Posts

No Peace Without Process: Changing Course on Hezbollah’s Arms

Wake-Up Call: Economic Crisis Needs To Force Lebanon Towards A Green Recovery

Lebanon’s Housing Crisis: From Emergency Response to Sustainable Solutions

Going Hungry: The Empty Plates & Pockets Of Lebanon