Homes of Hardship: How the Lebanese Family Unit is Coming Undone

Many wealthy developed nations have thus far avoided the perils of population decline through mass immigration. For instance, member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have seen their TFR decline from 3.3 in 1960 to 1.5 in 2022. Declining birth rates have been attributed to rising costs and financial uncertainty around child rearing, increased housing expenses, and delayed parenthood amid growing dual-earner households. Across much of the European Union, however, population growth remained positive due to migration, while immigrants to the United States and Europe accounted for 47% and 70% of workforce growth, respectively, between 2011 and 2021.

Lebanon similarly saw its TRF begin to decline decades ago: in 1963, average births per Lebanese woman peaked at 5.91, afterwhich it steadily declined to reach 2.17 by 2008. Birthrates recovered slightly over the next seven years, reaching 2.39 in 2016, before continuing down the long-term slope to reach a TFA of 2.21 today.

Overall population decline has, however, set in rapidly since Lebanon’s 2019 financial collapse and subsequent political, economic, and security upheaval. More than 250,000 Lebanese left the country between 2019 and 2024, or roughly 7% of the population, according to estimates by the Institute of International Finance. Almost that many again, some 220,000 Lebanese, left in 2025 alone. Over 70% were skilled workers with an average age of 32: precisely the demographic that would otherwise be forming families, raising children, and driving economic growth.

Marriage Delay and Decay

Following the end of the civil war in 1990, the age at which Lebanese would have their first marriage began to increase steadily, to the point that Lebanese today tie the knot later than anywhere else in the Arab world, at an average of 30.4 years of age for women and 34.4 for men.

Various factors contributed to this dynamic: in the post-war period, neoliberal government policies eroded social protection systems, increasing living costs and pushing more women to enter the workforce and more young men to emigrate. Wedding costs also rose and social norms around marriage, children, and women’s economic empowerment changed.

Between 2008 and 2018, however, overall marriage rates rose, peaking above 40,000 annually in most years, according to government data. This was aided by a financial bubble that made credit readily available, allowing young couples to borrow to cover the costs of marriage, housing, and starting a household. Notably, divorce rates also increased in this period, rising from roughly 5,400 to 8,700 over the decade before the financial crisis.

When the country entered its years-long financial collapse in 2019, the Lebanese lira’s value began to plummet, inflation soared, incomes shrank in real value, savings were seized by the banks. The cost of raising a child became staggering, even for many dual-income households.

Marriage rates consequently plummeted, with 2025 wedding activity 35% below pre-2019 levels. Divorce rates fluctuated, but significantly, the divorce-to-marriage ratio reached about 28% in 2023, meaning for roughly every three weddings that year an existing marriage collapsed.

Of the households staying together, a 2025 study by the Arab Democratic Center found that the country’s economic crisis had led to declining living standards, decreased children’s academic performance, and rising marital conflicts. Much of the intermarital conflict arose from “disagreements over the division of household responsibilities after women entered the labor market placing additional burdens on wives.”

The study, which surveyed 289 Lebanese families in Beirut and its suburbs, found a 45% increase in marital conflict linked to households’ inability to meet basic financial needs. These disputes resulted in psychological violence (31%), verbal violence (11%), and physical violence (2%).

While divorce rates have fluctuated since 2019, the reason they aren’t far higher is the prohibitive costs of legal proceedings and maintaining separate households, according to Rima Majed, assistant professor of sociology at the American University of Beirut. She said these financial constraints compel many couples to remain in fractured relationships.

A Wake-up Call for the State

The question is not whether Lebanese families will adapt – they always do, but at what cost? And what will the family unit of tomorrow look like? The Lebanese must demand that the state rebuild what it allowed to collapse. With housing unaffordable, education fragmenting, healthcare inaccessible, and income supports near nonexistent, the government fully implementing the National Social Protection Strategy would be a giant step in stabilizing the situation.

Reversing the family’s decline requires reinvestment in social foundations that allow families to thrive. Such items could include universal childcare and paid leave, affordable housing, free education through university, and comprehensive safety nets funded through progressive taxation. Such measures are standard in developed economies and fundamental support their progress.

The state’s choice is simple: invest in families now, or manage demographic decline. The cost of inaction compounds daily.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of BADIL | The Alternative Policy Institute or its editorial team.