Rewired Influence: Syria’s Power Crisis Invites Geopolitical Tug-of-War

Before the start of the war in 2011, Syria’s state-owned electricity sector already needed upgrading due to increasing demand. The electrification rate across the country was 93 percent, with 100 percent access to electricity in urban areas, and 83 percent in rural ones. There were 13 operational power plants in Syria a decade ago, 60 percent of which used to work on natural gas, 35 percent on fuel oil, and 5 percent with hydropower, for an approximate total capacity of 8,000 MW. Today, roughly one quarter of this capacity is being generated. Current electricity output represents around 30 percent of peak demand, which some estimates place as high as 9,000 MW in the summer.

According to ESCWA, by 2018, just halfway through the war, the electricity sector had already sustained around $7.3 billion in damages. This is a direct result of infrastructure deterioration due to the conflict, including destroyed power plants and transmission lines, exacerbated by sanctions that hobbled efforts to maintain and rehabilitate existing assets or develop new ones. In March, the new administration stated that the electricity sector will require $40 billion just to return to its pre-2011 status.

In the years leading up to the Assad regime’s fall, 80 percent of Syria’s hydrocarbon needs were purchased from abroad using foreign currency, including intermittent supplies of refined petroleum products from Iran and Iraq. Today, such purchases from abroad are even more difficult, given Syria’s foreign currency shortage, even while domestic supplies remain offline, given that the country’s major oil and gas fields in the northeast are still not under the new government’s control.

Economic challenges have further compounded the problems, including Syria’s inability to access international financial markets to source spare parts for maintenance and the currency devaluation affecting contractual obligations with local suppliers.  

As a result, Syrian authorities have been forced to impose electricity rationing, leaving citizens with only a few hours of electricity per day. Even this limited provision varies considerably between districts and cities. Citizens have had to resort to alternatives to keep their homes lit, such as candles, kerosene lamps, stoves, and even pistachio shells. Private generators, batteries, and solar panels are also options for those who can afford it.  

From Relying on Iran to being Tethered to Turkey, Qatar, and Russia 

The last Iranian tanker due to supply crude oil to Syria made a U-turn the same day Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed. Offsetting oil imports were then trucked across the Turkish and Lebanese borders during the first few months of Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) rule, while Russia also emerged as a major oil and fuel supplier for Syria’s new government. For Moscow, this move has been seen as an attempt to shore up its ability to keep its military bases along Syria’s Mediterranean coast. 

Turkey has pledged to support Syria through the restoration of electricity supplies and sent a delegation just a few weeks after Asaad’s fall to discuss the reconstruction of the country’s oil, gas, and electricity infrastructure. This builds on Turkey’s involvement in recent years in Syria’s northwestern provinces. There were talks around sending Turkish and Qatari power barges to Syria, similar to the ones Lebanon operated between 2013 and 2021, but the financial and logistical challenges of this are still under discussion with Syrian authorities.  

Qatar has also moved to aid Syria’s new government through addressing the country’s sharp decrease in gas supplies, from around 8.4 billion cubic meter (BCM) in 2011 to around 3 BCM in 2024. In March, Doha announced that it would begin supplying Syria with natural gas via Jordan, in a bid to help the new authorities tackle acute power shortages. This gas, delivered through Jordan’s Aqaba port, should allow Syria to receive around 400 MW of additional electricity, reaching 8 hours of nationwide supply in the coming months. However, as this section of the Arab Gas Pipeline between Aqaba and Mafraq is already in use to supply Israeli gas to Jordan and Egypt, questions arise whether the gas supplied to Syria would also be Israeli. 

The Costly Connection to Private Turkish Power 

Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, regions under the control of opposition groups in northeast ¹ and northwest Syria ² suffered from the same severe power outages, as the power stations feeding them were concentrated in area under the control or the regime or rival opposition groups. This pushed some cities in the northwest, namely Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain, to sign an agreement in 2021 with the Turkish-Syrian company AK Energy ³ to deliver electricity from Turkey and help locals avoid costly private generator subscriptions. AK Energy had already supplied electricity to Azaz ⁴, Jarablus, Jindires and al-Bab in the northern and eastern part of Aleppo, using prepaid cards. A similar arrangement was completed in Souran, Akhtareen, Mareh, and Afreen between April 2019 and January 2020 with STE Energy, another Turkish-Syrian company ⁵, while HTS in Idlib signed an agreement with Green Energy ⁶ in May 2021 for the same purpose.  

Those solutions with private-sector entities, although providing around-the-clock electricity, have often been too expensive ⁷ for northern residents, provoking demonstrations against the companies. Regions in the northeast (Raqqa, Tabqa, and to a lesser extent Manbij) had access during the war to surrounding hydroelectric dams and therefore had greater control over their electricity supply. Following the March 2025 agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a United States-backed Kurdish militia, to integrate the latter into the central state, government forces deployed to the Techrin Dam in a first trial to test the agreement’s implementation with the autonomous Kurdish administration. If successful, it is expected that this will expand to future discussions around the SDF-controlled oil and gas fields in the northeast. 

No Renewables Rescue 

The use of renewable energy, in particular solar energy, has gained increasing momentum of late in Syria. The country benefits from abundant sun throughout the year and from vast desert areas, which offer a unique opportunity to provide cleaner and cheaper energy sources. Solar panels have provided power to homes and public institutions including universities and hospitals, as well as for citizens in what had been opposition areas, such as Idlib, before the Assad regime fell. Syria benefited from Lebanon’s so-called solar boom since 2020, with solar panels and batteries smuggled across the borders. Yet installing those systems remained limited to citizens who could afford the cost, and did not lead to a technology boom like the one witnessed in Lebanon, due to the continued tightening on financial flows to and from Syria.  

On the regulatory front, the previous regime launched a renewable energy fund in 2021 with the ostensible goal of providing low or no-interest loans to facilitate renewable energy technologies, given the absence of immediate central solutions. It also issued legislation (law 32 of 2021) introducing amendments to the 2010 Electricity Law. It authorized the private sector to invest in electricity generation and to sell that power to the national grid. Leveraging the restoration of diplomatic relations with some Arab countries, the regime also attempted to benefit from infrastructure investments, such as an Emirati-financed 300 MW solar park in the Damascus area, and others in industrial zones in Aleppo. None of these ever materialized.  

Looking Ahead 

Syria’s electricity scarcity has multiple negative consequences, from compounding urgent humanitarian issues to impeding social stability. Addressing it will require ambitious measures at the central government level and from the international community. The US and the European Union must engage with the new administration on rehabilitation efforts. To date, with the US continuing to maintain stringent sanctions, Syria’s new administration is restricted in its ability to implement comprehensive reforms to the sector. Instead, it must aim for quick fixes to increase electricity supply, while pleading with the international community – in particular Washington and Brussels – to support its rehabilitation efforts on all fronts, including for electricity. 

Under the current circumstances, the new administration’s plans to restore electricity provision in the short to medium term by relying on Turkish and Qatari support will not provide durable solutions. Rather, this reliance on foreign powers for power provision will create dependency and risk Syria’s long-term political and energy sovereignty. 

While Syria’s new government aims to secure cheaper and affordable energy for all regions, the previous piecemeal solution of contracting private sector Turkish companies should be avoided, given the high cost in monetary terms and in the relinquishing of energy sovereignty. Instead, as Syria pursues sanctions relief, the new government should incentivize the uptake of renewable solar energy installations through financial mechanisms such as microloans and tax credits, while also engaging with communities and domestic investors to lay the groundwork for large-scale projects.  

It remains to be seen how Syria’s new administration will deal with the country’s electricity crisis, and its options will continue to be restricted as long as international sanctions remain in place. However, the push towards harnessing Syria’s solar potential and restoring access to its domestic hydrocarbon resources offer the most likely path for Damascus to regain its energy sovereignty in the long run.   

ENDNOTES

¹ Including most of Raqqa and Hasaka governorates, part of Deir El Zor governorate north-east of the Euphrates, and parts of Aleppo governorate around Manbij and Kobane, and the area around Tal Rifaat.

² Including part of Idlib governorate, northern Hama, northern Latakia and western Aleppo.

³ Owned by Syrian Ibrahim Khalil (31%), Hassan Tatar (25%), Rajab Chouban (20%) and Yassin Yogil (24%).

^⁴ The first region to sign with AK Energy in April 2018.

⁵ Formed by a group of Syrian businessmen working in the fields of telecom and real estate.

⁶ Managed by Omar Shkouk.

⁷ KWh prices increased by 188% between 2019 and 2022, from 85 pence to 2.45 Turkish liras (14.8 cents/KWh).

Marc Ayoub is an Energy Policy Researcher currently pursuing his PhD at the University of Galway, as well as an Associate Fellow at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.