A Generation in Limbo: Redefining Refugee Policy in Lebanon

Although Lebanon has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has ratified other international agreements which obligate the country to ensure basic civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights for all individuals within its territory, including refugees.1 Lebanon is also an adherent to international humanitarian law, which enshrines the principle of non-refoulement. Yet most of these principles have been flouted. In 2011, the Lebanese government initially adopted an open border, non-policy approach towards Syrian refugees, delegating the task of registering Syrians to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This weakened the state’s ability to manage the crisis. In late 2014 once the number of refugees passed one million, the Lebanese government sought to regain control of the situation and implemented measures which restricted Syrians from entering Lebanon and tightened residency and work permit regulations. This policy of exclusion resulted in many Syrians becoming illegal settlers, living at risk of arrest and deportation and deprived them of rights, including access to public services, legal housing, participation in the formal job market, and freedom of movement.  

Shortly afterwards, the Lebanese government requested UNHCR to suspend the registration of Syrian refugees, which complicated the effective management and support of the refugee population. From that point on, neither the government nor the UN agency has had accurate data on the number of refugees settled in Lebanon. Without UNHCR registration, refugees lack official recognition, which limits their access to aid, legal status, and protection, and increases their vulnerability to exploitation, arrest, and deportation.  

This hostile approach has continued to worsen, with a Higher Defence Council decision in 2019 mandating the summary deportation of Syrians who entered Lebanon illegally after April 24, 2019, the demolition of permanent and semi-permanent refugee shelters, and a crackdown on Syrians working without authorisation. This precipitated the illegal yet widespread practice of deportations and forced returns that continued throughout 2024. It should be noted that such deportations have not been reported since the escalation of the war in Lebanon in September 2024.²    

Limited regularisation of refugees has perpetuated marginalisation, confining them to live in limbo, stuck between their unregistered status in Lebanon and inability to go elsewhere. Tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities have increased over the past decade due to competition for scarce resources, competition over job opportunities in low-skills sectors, and public services—all of which reached boiling point in 2024 following the murder of Pascal Sleiman, a high-ranking member of the right-wing Lebanese Forces party. The murder was attributed to Syrian nationals, leading to violence and illegal restrictions against refugees.  

Lebanon alone cannot manage the refugee crisis, and international actors – primarily the West, along with Arab countries, and Syria itself must play a more decisive role. The lack of viable alternatives for Syrian refugees, combined with financial support for an ineffective system, has meant all parties to the Syrian conflict have indirectly reinforced precarious conditions for refugees. Their reluctance to take decisive political action and share the burden more equitably has allowed the crisis to fester and placed pressure on refugees to return to Syria under coercive circumstances.  

Despite the EU’s significant financial support to Lebanon, the bloc’s approach has been flawed and short-sighted. The EU maintains that current conditions in Syria do not yet allow for safe returns, but remains unwilling to admit more refugees from Lebanon into its borders. The primary focus has been on stopping irregular migration through securitising Lebanon’s maritime border and so-called “resilience-building” in the country, rather than working on a viable solution that addresses the concerns of refugees and host communities. As a result, Lebanese authorities have repeatedly pressed the EU for concrete support and resorted to more aggressive tactics, including threatening to allow refugees into Europe and stepping up forced deportations. In May 2024, the EU announced an additional €1 billion euros in aid to Lebanon to help manage the refugee crisis, but Lebanese leaders widely criticised this move, arguing that it did not address the underlying issues. Instead, the aid was viewed as another temporary measure that failed to tackle the core problems. 

Lebanese leaders have also turned to the Arab world to form a unified front to coordinate with the Syrian government on refugee matters. However, GCC engagement has provided little result, with a lack of political will and burden-sharing. As the latest actor to pursue a rapprochement with the Syrian regime and as an ally of both Lebanon and the West, the GCC must step up to become a key player in negotiations for long-term solutions. Now that over 300,000 Syrians have returned to Syria, and the Syrian regime has been re-integrated into the Arab League, Arab leaders and the West will need to use this platform to engage the Syrian government in meaningful dialogue about making sure voluntary returns are safe and dignified, and re-launch the political process in coordination with all stakeholders.  

Policy Recommendations 

A fundamental shift in approach is essential to move beyond the current non-policy status quo. While the political landscape in Lebanon is fraught with challenges, the Syrian refugee crisis still requires a response that is both pragmatic and principled. What this paper proposes is a comprehensive, long-term policy framework in alignment with the UN’s durable solutions framework, that balances the immediate political and socio-economic realities with the need for sustainable, rights-based solutions. This integrated strategy functions through three interdependent levers: closely monitored voluntary returns that are safe and dignified, improved legal migration pathways, and regularisation of refugees. These levers must be employed at different times, in varying magnitudes, and in response to evolving conditions. Their success is co-dependent, meaning that none of these levers can work effectively in isolation, and they must be applied in a coordinated and flexible manner. At the same time, they must remain politically expedient: incentives to engage in safe and dignified voluntary returns and legal migration will always have to outweigh regularisation as the objective of this framework is not to settle refugees in Lebanon over the long-term. This framework sets out a realistic policy prescription that seeks to preserve Lebanon’s long-term interests alongside those of the refugees that it has hosted for half a generation. 

1. Closely monitored voluntary returns that are safe and dignified: Establish and implement protection and monitoring mechanisms for voluntary returns that prioritise safety, dignity, and refugee consent, supported by international cooperation and financial aid, to facilitate gradual and secure reintegration in Syria. Returns should be fully monitored and accompanied by comprehensive safety protocols to address the risks refugees face. 
2. Improved legal pathways for migration: Support legitimate pathways for the resettlement of Syrian refugees, focusing on resettlement of the most vulnerable populations, and facilitate the migration of both highly and low skilled workers. 
3. Regularisation of remaining Syrian refugees: Regularise the legal status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon by providing temporary living and working permits, ensuring better integration into the socio-economic fabric, economic dividends, state revenue and reduced exploitation.  

The success of each lever hinges on sustained commitment and collaboration among all stakeholders over the long-term. That’s because achieving a stable future for both Syrian refugees and Lebanese citizens requires moving beyond short-term fixes, which have repeatedly failed, and rejecting piecemeal approaches that only entrench cycles of instability. Lebanese political leaders and community representatives must therefore shift from scapegoating refugees as a distraction from domestic challenges and instead adopt a forward-looking strategy. This means prioritising the rebuilding of Lebanon’s economy and integrating long-term refugee crisis management into broader recovery efforts. 

At the same time, the international community, particularly donors, must rethink their approach. Financial aid alone will not suffice. What is needed is a deeper, strategic, and political commitment to fostering sustainable solutions. Donors must work alongside Lebanon, and Syria, to craft policies that deliver meaningful, long-term outcomes, improving the lives of both Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees while fostering greater regional stability. 

Policy Lever 1: Closely monitored voluntary returns that are safe and dignified 

Refugee surveys have consistently shown that a large proportion of refugees hope to return to Syria one day. This indicates that, if and when conditions in Syria allow, many people may be receptive to participating in an assisted return programme. Such programmes could offer a dignified alternative to coercive repatriation efforts. However, it is essential that any return initiatives prioritise the safety, dignity, and well-being of returnees. Returns must be fully voluntary, carefully monitored, and accompanied by comprehensive safety protocols.  

The recent return of over 300,000 refugees due to the conflict in Lebanon highlights the need for such robust, long-term mechanisms. The rushed and uncoordinated nature of recent returns has led to significant gaps in protection and assistance, leaving many returnees vulnerable, with limited shelter options and facing abuses from various actors, including the Syrian regime. This underscores the urgency of implementing a structured return programme to prevent further ad-hoc returns, which could exacerbate insecurity and instability for returnees. Moreover, failed returns would only disincentivise future return opportunities.  

As such, the UN, with key stakeholders, should establish protection, support, and monitoring systems to ensure the well-being of returnees. These efforts will help donors and humanitarian organisations address current gaps in support and protection, enabling them to make future returns more secure and better-informed. 

For Syria, a coordinated voluntary return programme would help reclaim human capital vital for the country’s socio-economic recovery. For Lebanon, reducing the refugee population through voluntary returns would alleviate social stressors while ensuring compliance with Lebanon’s international legal obligations. For Europe and the broader international community, this approach would reduce the number of refugees seeking resettlement and mitigate pressures related to irregular migration. For refugees, and for Syria, such a programme would provide an opportunity to return to their homeland in safety and dignity, allowing them to reunite with family members, reclaim their properties, and rebuild their lives in familiar surroundings. This would also offer a path away from the instability, discrimination, and economic hardships they currently face in Lebanon, giving them a chance to regain autonomy and contribute to Syria’s reconstruction efforts. 

Challenges 

Safe return 

The Syrian regime’s history of brutality and human rights abuses, indifference to international laws and norms and manipulation of humanitarian aid efforts cast doubt on whether it would uphold guarantees for the security and well-being of returning refugees. UN agencies and human rights organisations have been highly critical of the Assad government’s treatment of returnees to date, having documented numerous instances of arbitrary arrest, torture, sexual violence, forced disappearances, restrictions on movement, and denial of housing, land, and property rights. Recent examples of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearance of returnees since September 23, 2024, further underscore these risks.  

The security situation across Syria continues to be volatile, marked by the absence of rule of law, armed groups, social unrest and violence. Even in areas deemed physically safe, Syria’s capacity and willingness to absorb large numbers of returnees is questionable, given that public infrastructure, services, and the economy remains in tatters. In 2023, an estimated 85 percent of households – approximately 12 million people – were unable to meet their basic needs, while half the population was deemed “food insecure”. Introducing large numbers of returnees into this environment, particularly in crowded urban areas, is presently unrealistic – and the fact that some 300,000 Syrians have returned to Syria does not make this less true. 

Further complicating matters are US and European sanctions against Syria, which are a significant factor forestalling Syrian economic recovery and rehabilitation. Prominent policymakers in both the US, the EU, and beyond also oppose talking with the Assad regime.  

Deportations, forced returns, and safe zones 

The notion of ‘voluntary returns’ stands in contrast with previous examples of deportations or coerced returns implemented by Lebanese authorities. Highly criticised by the international community, these are illegal and violate peoples’ basic human rights and dignity. By disregarding peoples’ individual circumstances by rounding them up for deportation, people face risks of abuse once in Syria. Such actions also erode trust between Lebanon and its international partners, undermining opportunities for collaboration on more sustainable solutions and potentially leading to further isolation of Lebanon on the global stage. Implementing a policy of closely monitored voluntary returns that are safe and dignified would void the need for deportations.  

In Europe, return policies are frequently debated within the context of controversial so-called ‘safe zones.’ While some countries support rapprochement with the Syrian regime and establishing ‘safe zones,’ others oppose these measures. The challenge with ‘safe zones’ is that they are often designated by countries without considering whether these areas are suitable or desirable for refugees to return to willingly. However, fostering voluntary returns could help reconcile these differing perspectives and reduce reliance on these contentious zones. Encouraging voluntary returns would provide an acceptable and humane alternative, allowing refugees to return home willingly if conditions are safe, rather than having third countries dictate the perceived safety of particular areas. 

It is also crucial to emphasise that recent Syrian returnees, particularly those who have returned since September 2024, were not motivated by improvements in Syria’s conditions, nor because Syria has become safe. While these returnees crossed back into Syria of their own accord, they were indirectly forced by the intensifying conflict in Lebanon, which has pushed them into yet another cycle of displacement. Decisions regarding refugee returns should not be based on the situation in Lebanon but rather on objective indicators of safety, stability, and the availability of essential resources within Syria itself. 

Moving forward 

Engagement with Damascus 

The Syrian regime has historically failed to respect human rights, often committing violations that compromise the safety and rights of returnees. In this context, securing a political agreement with Damascus and leveraging compliance through various mechanisms is essential, ensuring that any return process is safe, voluntary, and dignified. The return plan must include structured political dialogue involving key stakeholders — such as international organisations, regional actors, and the Syrian government — where clear guarantees of safety, non-discrimination, and legal protection are agreed upon. This dialogue must also address specific mechanisms for monitoring returnees’ conditions, ensuring compliance with human rights standards, and providing assurances that refugees are not subject to retribution upon their return. Without such concrete agreements, any return plan risks being ineffective and unsafe. 

Leveraging incentives and sanctions, as well as engagement with regional actors such as the Arab League, can help secure concrete commitments from the Syrian regime. A coordinated approach involving Arab normalisation efforts with the Syrian government could also promote more significant and sustainable returns. Foremost on the list of incentives is partial sanctions relief in exchange for significant steps taken by Syrian authorities to guarantee safe and dignified returns, verified by independent monitoring mechanisms. Such a system would facilitate donor countries’ ability to fund early recovery initiatives, which are essential to stabilise communities by helping to restore basic services, livelihoods, and governance structures. International donors should also press for full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties and support reforms in Syria related to counterterrorism, housing, land, property rights, and conscription.  

Transparent information on the administrative conditions and processes required for returning should be provided, while guaranteeing unhindered access for monitoring by UN entities and other international organisations and ensuring returnees can access necessary civil documentation without discrimination.  

Large-scale returns: a critical moment 

The recent large-scale return of over 300,000 Syrian refugees presents an unprecedented scenario to assess the realities of voluntary returns and refine strategies moving forward. This return wave, while significant, highlights the need for stronger coordination, support systems, and protection mechanisms to ensure that future returns are safe, sustainable, and conducted with dignity. 

The current priority should be on scaling up efforts to manage returns effectively. Comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of the recent returnees’ experiences are essential to understanding the challenges they face, particularly in terms of reintegration, access to basic services, housing, and protection from abuses, including forced conscription by the Syrian regime. 

Syria’s capacity to absorb large numbers of returnees remains a critical concern. The country’s economy and infrastructure are still in disrepair, and absorbing many returnees in a short period could overwhelm already fragile systems, especially in urban areas. The Syrian government has hinted to a willingness to accommodate returnees in rural regions, which may offer more space and opportunities for reconstruction and development. However, targeted investment in these areas is needed to ensure they can provide viable livelihoods and basic services for returnees. 

To facilitate large-scale returns, there must be renewed efforts to address the housing, land, and property (HLP) rights of refugees, many of whom lost their homes during the conflict. Compensation and legal mechanisms must be established to help returnees reclaim their properties or receive adequate compensation. The Syrian regime’s history of resistance to addressing HLP rights underscores the need for a strategic approach. Negotiations with the Syrian government must include clear conditions on restoring these rights, backed by international pressure and incentives, such as partial sanctions relief, to encourage compliance. 

Rather than placing the burden solely on international organisations, the restoration of HLP rights and the creation of viable livelihoods for returnees should become central components of future negotiations with the Syrian regime. These measures are essential for ensuring that returns contribute to Syria’s long-term recovery and that returnees can rebuild their lives in safety and dignity. 

Policy Lever 2: Improved legal pathways for migration 

Creating legal avenues for Syrian refugees to settle in the EU, not to mention the broader West and the GCC, are necessary components of any long-term solution to the refugee crisis in Lebanon as well as an essential step for the EU’s own economic and demographic stability. Despite the political rhetoric and the rise of far right and anti-immigration sentiments across Europe, the reality is that many EU countries need and quietly welcome legal migration to stem population decline. This need is driven by aging populations, below-replacement birth rates, and labour shortages that migration can help address. This reality is increasingly being acknowledged even by staunch anti-immigration politicians and leaders, such as Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who has paradoxically had to confront the persistent rise in migrant flows while simultaneously increasing the number of migrants who can legally work in Italy in order to address labour shortages. 

These measures would also reduce pressure on Lebanon and provide structured, safer routes for refugees, significantly reducing illegal migratory flows. The lessons of 2015, when the EU was overwhelmed by a poorly managed increase in refugees, highlight the importance of creating a proactive, controlled approach to migration that serves both humanitarian and strategic interests. To achieve this, two parallel paths can be developed: 

Resettlement for vulnerable refugees  

Resettlement – the voluntary and permanent transfer of refugees in acute need to a third country – is a compassionate and practical response to the needs of the extremely vulnerable refugees. Resettlement provides a regulated means to manage migration, ensuring that incoming refugees are documented and vetted. This process enhances security and allows for better planning in terms of resource allocation, as host countries can prepare for the arrival of refugees, ensuring they have access to necessary services such as healthcare, housing, and education. 

Legal migration for low and highly skilled workers 

Legal migration includes highly skilled workers who lack opportunities in Lebanon as well as the lower-skilled labour force for sectors where there are labour shortages within the EU. By providing refugees with legal status, people can more easily access the formal labour market, reducing the likelihood of exploitation and enabling them to contribute fiscally and economically. Besides the clear advantages that labour migration brings to the EU, establishing legal pathways for Syrian refugees also offers multiple significant benefits for Lebanon. It can improve employment prospects in Lebanon for highly skilled Lebanese workers by reducing competition with highly skilled Syrian refugees, whilst creating more space for Lebanese professionals to thrive in competitive sectors. It can also reduce competition for low skilled jobs, easing social tensions that have developed due to the overlapping labour forces. Furthermore, legal migration stimulates Syrian refugee remittance inflows back to Lebanon, contributing to the country’s economic stability and improving the autonomy of refugees in the country.  

Challenges 

No political will  

Growing nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment across EU member states means many European countries face internal pressures from far-right groups and nationalist politicians who resist the idea of increasing the intake of refugees, particularly from the Middle East. Today, even countries like Germany and Sweden, which have already accepted large numbers of refugees, are now under significant domestic pressure to limit further intake. They face ongoing challenges with integration, housing, and social cohesion, making them more reluctant to support broader legal migration pathways.  

Furthermore, the lack of political unity within the EU regarding migration contributes to the slow progress in expanding legal migration pathways. While some member states are more open to accepting refugees, others remain staunchly opposed. This division has resulted in a fragmented approach to refugee policy, preventing the EU from implementing a cohesive, union-wide strategy for managing Syrian refugees and legal migration. Even with the recent adoption of the so-called Pact on Migration and Asylum, criticism has come from both ends of the political spectrum—some argue that the pact is overly permissive on migration, while others believe it does not go far enough in addressing humanitarian needs and integration. 

To overcome these challenges, there needs to be a concerted shift in political will. Moving beyond short-term political calculations driven by populist pressures and anti-immigration sentiment is essential. The EU must foster stronger collaboration among member states, promoting fairer burden-sharing and unified policies that prioritise refugee protection while addressing concerns about integration. Political leaders must emphasise how structured and well-managed legal migration can alleviate labour shortages, boost economic growth and state revenue, as well as address demographic challenges such as aging populations. That will not be an easy sell, but it is one that is viable over time, even on the right of Europe’s political spectrum.  

Integration requires resources  

Beyond political will, integrating refugees into European societies and labour markets requires substantial upfront investment in both resettlement programmes and the establishment of legal migration pathways. These pathways include ensuring refugees have access to adequate language training, vocational programmes, and certification systems to help them meet labour market needs. For instance, legal migration pathways, such as those aimed at highly skilled or semi-skilled workers, would benefit from tailored integration strategies to smooth the transition into the labour market. These processes require legal processing coordination, streamlined bureaucracy, and support systems that include not only labour market integration but also access to housing, healthcare, and social services. Resistance may arise from local populations concerned about job competition, national identity, and security risks, especially if integration policies are poorly communicated or perceived as inadequate. It is therefore vital that governments implement proactive measures to address these concerns, emphasising the potential for long-term economic growth and social stability that a well-managed influx of labour can bring. 

By framing refugee integration as an alternative to irregular migration as well as economic and fiscal opportunity, EU leaders can plausibly frame the policy as a boon rather than a burden. Legal migration pathways are meant to complement existing labour market strategies, help fill shortages and promote diversity. And it is crucial for political leaders to communicate these benefits clearly to both the public and the political class to reduce resistance and foster broader support. 

Limited scope  

While resettlement programmes are crucial, they are limited in scope, with UNHCR reporting that less than one percent of refugees meet the specific requirements for resettlement. Similarly, the legal pathways for highly skilled workers, while beneficial, will also be constrained. These pathways focus on a small segment of the refugee population who possess specialised skills and meet specific criteria, thereby excluding the vast majority who do not fit these categories. The effectiveness of these pathways in addressing the broader refugee crisis is thus inherently limited at the moment. Only a small fraction of refugees can benefit from such programmes, leaving the majority without viable legal avenues for migration.  

To address this limitation, a more inclusive longer term and gradual approach to legal migration is required, including pathways for semi-skilled and lower-skilled workers. This includes expanding the scope of existing programmes and creating new avenues in countries of origin that reflect the diverse skills and needs of the refugee population, ensuring that more refugees have access to safe and legal migration options.  

Moving forward 

New resettlement opportunities  

The recently adopted EU ‘Pact on Migration and Asylum’ (Migration Pact) provides a ‘Union Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Framework’ (URF) which is designed to enhance legal pathways for those in need of protection and strengthen international partnerships. It introduces common procedures and a two-year plan to coordinate the number of admissions, supported by EU funding. Now that member states have agreed to implement a fairer and more unified resettlement programme across the bloc, the EU must also agree the ideal criteria to select eligible candidates, likely prioritising the most vulnerable refugees, as per the current UN guidance.3 According to UNHCR, the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in need of resettlement was 232,000. However, the figure is potentially much higher.4 The EU, through its new resettlement framework, will thus need to prioritise and expedite the process to provide these individuals with the safety and opportunities they desperately need. 

Pathways for highly skilled migrants  

Adapting EU migration instruments for Syrian refugees in Lebanon requires innovative solutions. The EU’s Migration Pact offers potential new pathways by establishing the EU Talent Pool, which makes it easier for highly skilled workers to live and work in the EU. One such policy tool is the ‘Talent Partnership’ framework, which supports partner country nationals to study, work, or train in the EU. Currently, this framework is only available for Egyptian, Moroccan, and Tunisian nationals, but could be expanded to Lebanon.  

Multilateral partnerships between countries of origin and destination could also be established, involving both public and private sector stakeholders. For example, ‘Temporary Migration Partnerships,’ where payroll taxes from destination countries are reinvested in innovation and education at origin, reducing dependency on migration; or ‘Skills and Mobility Partnerships’ which involve apprenticeships in destination countries, supported by public funding and employer subsidies.  

Migration pathways should also be extended, in cooperation with the Lebanese government, to include Lebanese citizens. This would provide opportunities for Lebanese individuals seeking work, study, and training abroad, while also helping stop Lebanon’s terminal brain drain by offering professional growth abroad with the objective of returning to the country. 

Opportunities for medium and low skilled workers 

In addition to pathways for highly skilled workers, the EU must also address shortages in sectors that rely on medium and low skilled labour. Expanding the Talent Partnership framework or developing new mechanisms that cater to workers with varying skill levels is essential. While this may initially appear to increase competition for lower-wage jobs, competition will be limited if refugees are directed towards filling positions identified as having EU-wide shortages, including those that are lower-paid and susceptible to future shortages. Legal migration would achieve the triple objective of facilitating their entry into the European labour market, helping address labour gaps in critical sectors, and preventing social tensions linked to competition over employment.  

To increase the pace at which Syrian refugees can be resettled outside Lebanon, GCC countries will have to play a significant role by adopting similar migration programmes to those proposed for the EU. These countries possess rapidly expanding economies and a growing demand for labour, particularly in industries that rely heavily on foreign (South Asian) workers. With lower language barriers for Arabic-speaking refugees and cultural similarities, the GCC states are well-positioned to offer opportunities for Syrian refugees, for example through existing labour exchange mechanisms, addressing both humanitarian and economic needs. This shift would not only help ease the refugee burden on Lebanon but would also align with the labour market needs of the GCC countries, creating a mutually beneficial arrangement. 

Policy Lever 3: Regularisation of remaining Syrian refugees 

While over 300,000 Syrian refugees have returned to Syria since September 2024 due to the conflict in Lebanon, it is unrealistic to expect that all refugees will return or be resettled in the short- or even medium-term. With this reality in mind, maintaining the status quo for the remaining refugee population is untenable. The current state of passive neglect not only fails to address peoples’ fundamental needs but also perpetuates exploitation, sectarian tensions, and social unrest by further marginalising the refugees. This approach is also detrimental to Lebanese host communities, as the influx of informal labour drives down wages and creates resentment among Lebanese workers, particularly in low skilled sectors, further fuelling social tensions and undermining economic stability. 

Well-managed regularisation offers several advantages which indicate regularisation (as distinct from integration) could be a beneficial long-term policy for Lebanon. Economically, regularisation helps countries regulate labour markets, collect taxes, and understand employment dynamics as well as providing valuable demographic and labour market data, which aids the planning and control of future migration. Regularisation could also benefit the Lebanese population by creating a more equal economic and employment playing field. If Syrian refugees are employed legally, they are less likely to be paid cheap, exploitative wages which undercut Lebanese workers. Enforcing minimum wages for Syrian workers would be easier and help create fairer competition with Lebanese job seekers. A better economic situation could also allow for a more natural return to Syria if conditions allow, as people would have more opportunities to accumulate capital, which could in turn aid their reintegration into Syria, either through economic means or by overcoming bureaucratic obstacles, such as paying fees to commute mandatory military service. 

Socially, regularisation would improve people’s living and working conditions by reducing marginalisation. It aligns with Lebanon’s non-encampment policy, allowing Syrians to move freely and interact fully with society, especially for those confined to informal tented settlements. This mobility is essential for improving their quality of life and reducing the risks associated with ghetto-isation.  

Challenges 

Political appetite 

Regularisation is probably the most contentious solution for Lebanese policymakers and needs to account for the significant political and economic effort it would require. Due to Lebanon’s past experiences with Palestinian refugees, the country has a troubled relationship with long-term refugee presence. The government is currently focused on enforcing measures to manage irregularity that are both repressive and ineffective, so regularisation would require a comprehensive political shift.  

The goal of regularisation, therefore, is not to replicate the Palestinian experience but to create a framework that grants Syrian refugees legal status, allowing them to work and access services without full assimilation into Lebanese society. Unlike integration, regularisation focuses on temporary management, aiming for an eventual return to Syria. This framework would centralise services to avoid parallel systems, aligning refugee participation with existing national policies.  

Any regularisation programme would require careful management, phased implementation, and collaboration across sectors. Regularisation would have to be done gradually and with a focus on filling labour gaps, gradually opening up specific sectors such as agriculture, construction, and services, where Syrian refugees are already employed, largely informally. In Jordan, the government successfully implemented a regularisation scheme for Syrian refugees, though its constraints highlight the challenges of such efforts. Lebanon can learn from this, adapting a model that fits its own political and economic context. 

A financial burden? 

While implementing regularisation policies presents challenges, particularly in terms of political will and public support, the financial burden is often overstated. Political commitment is needed more than extensive financial resources. Earmarking tax revenues generated from the formal labour market — where regularised Syrian refugees would contribute — is one way to mitigate these challenges. Lebanon has demonstrated capacity for enforcement, when necessary, as evidenced by previous crackdowns on informal labour. Strengthening labour inspections and reallocating existing resources could help manage the transition without overwhelming the state budget. Clear communication of the long-term economic benefits, including reduced exploitation and increased tax revenues, could help garner support, whilst a phased approach could support a smoother integration, ensuring that Lebanon benefits from increased formal employment whilst addressing local concerns.

Moving forward 

Restart refugee registration  

The first step to any regularisation process would be re-starting registration of Syrian refugees with UNHCR. This would ensure legal protections, access to essential services and support the effective coordination and distribution of humanitarian aid. Registration would provide critical data for funding and planning longer-term solutions as well as an accurate headcount of the number of Syrian refugees in the country, a controversial topic subject to years of speculation.  

One-off regularisation  

While many different types of regularisation programmes exist, “one-off” programmes could be a suitable solution for both Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities. These are designed to provide temporary living and working permits by regularising the status of a large number of people within a short application window, under strict criteria related to employment and duration of residence. They can be limited in time, which encourages people to resolve their situation by the end of the programme and allows the issuing authorities to evaluate the programme on a regular basis.  

A ‘one-off’ programme could therefore offer regularisation to the current refugee population in Lebanon, but prevent further regularisations, disincentivising potential new refugees. Importantly, any regularisation programme in Lebanon should offer a clear pathway to return to Syria or onward migration, making the prospects more attractive than staying indefinitely.  

Livelihoods and the labour market 

The process of integrating Syrian workers into the formal labour market must be gradual. Syrians and Palestinians already participate in both informal and formal sectors, so the aim would be to transition people into the formal market whilst avoiding overwhelming the economy. Various mechanisms, such as regular labour market surveys, quotas, and employer incentives would help ensure that the integration of Syrians in the formal labour market would not undermine opportunities for Lebanese communities and Palestinian refugees.  

Lebanon would also need to seek the international community’s support to help cope with the additional workforce. Supporting the country’s economic recovery and reforms in line with international plans agreed upon by the Lebanese government is essential. International donors should collaborate with Lebanon to commit to investments that benefit both refugees and host communities. Accurate data from refugee registrations would offer new opportunities for international donors to invest in public services through targeted infrastructure projects, such as expanding healthcare facilities, increasing school capacities, and strengthening transportation networks. 

The rights granted to Syrian refugees must be considered in the context of Palestinian refugees. Historically, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have faced their own set of restrictions on employment, property ownership, and other rights. Providing Syrian refugees with more rights than Palestinian refugees has the potential to lead to increased tensions. Therefore, any regularisation programme must strike a balance that respects the historical context and existing policies regarding refugee rights in Lebanon and apply to all groups equally. 

Conclusion 

The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon has reached a pivotal juncture, particularly in the aftermath of the recent large-scale return of over 300,000 refugees. Inaction is no longer a viable option. Over the past decade, Lebanon’s failure to implement humane, effective policies has exacerbated both refugees’ suffering and the strain on Lebanon’s socio-economic fabric. International stakeholders, particularly the EU, must play a more decisive role in addressing this protracted crisis. The interconnectedness of Syria, Lebanon, and Europe through historical, political, and economic ties makes it clear that no single actor can bear the burden alone. The policy recommendations outlined here — closely monitored voluntary returns that are safe and dignified, legal migration pathways, and the regularisation of Syrian refugees — offer a balanced, comprehensive framework to better manage the situation. 

Each of these recommendations must be pursued in tandem with careful attention to the political and economic realities within Lebanon, Syria, and the broader international community. Regularisation programmes should be implemented with an eye toward both the rights of refugees and the pressures faced by Lebanese citizens. Any voluntary returns must prioritise safety and dignity, requiring robust international oversight and cooperation with the Syrian regime. Legal migration pathways, particularly to the EU and the GCC, offer an avenue to alleviate Lebanon’s internal pressures whilst also contributing to the international workforce. 

This crisis will not be resolved through short-term, coercive measures. The realities of forced deportation and illegal migration not only violate human rights but also perpetuate cycles of instability. A coordinated, long-term approach involving all stakeholders — Syrian refugees, the Lebanese government, the EU, GCC states, and international donors — is essential to prevent further deterioration. Now is the time to shift away from reactive, temporary measures and toward a durable, rights-based framework that ensures stability, dignity, and shared responsibility. If the policies recommended here are pursued with sustained commitment, Lebanon and its international partners can hope to provide a more stable, equitable future for both Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities.