The Weight of Expectations: Lebanon’s Uphill Struggle for Reform

Reformers must be realistic about what the new government can achieve while setting the groundwork for 2026 elections

The Weight of Expectations: Lebanon’s Uphill Struggle for Reform

The Lebanese Parliament’s overwhelming vote of confidence in the new Council of Ministers this week added a legislative seal to a growing groundswell of hope for the country’s future. This began in January with the ascent of President Joseph Aoun, who in his inaugural speech pledged to bring all weapons under state control, reform the judiciary and root out corruption. Optimism rose again when the unlikely figure of Nawaf Salam ascended to the premiership, likewise pledging comprehensive state reforms to restore citizens’ trust. When Salam announced the Council of Ministers on February 8, with cabinet seats filled (mostly) with genuine technocrats, fundamental change suddenly seemed within reach.

Yet, this initial momentum belies the steep road ahead for Aoun and Salam’s agenda. If Lebanon’s woes were merely technical, they would have been solved long ago. The country is not short of knowledge and expertise, and over the decades numerous reform efforts have been attempted. Where they all have died is in the crossfire of sectarian power struggles and the state’s capture by an entrenched ruling class.

This is where the new government is weak. Indeed, the very thing Aoun and Salam embody that inspires the nation’s hope threatens to render them ineffective at implementing policy—neither is enmeshed in or beholden to Lebanon’s traditional power centers. Prior to taking office, Aoun was the firm hand and no-nonsense commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Salam, who left his position as president of the International Court of Justice to return to Lebanon, could hardly have a CV more sparkling with integrity. What brought them to power, however, was not their upstanding reputations, but rather heavy lifting from abroad. Washington, Paris and Riyadh, seeking to capitalize on Hezbollah’s weakened position following the war with Israel, strongarmed Lebanon’s fractious political elite into line to ensure Aoun and Salam received parliamentary approval.

A common refrain for many years was that Hezbollah’s tutelage was preventing the state’s reform and perpetuating its ills – a well-earned criticism for the Party of God.

A common refrain for many years was that Hezbollah’s tutelage was preventing the state’s reform and perpetuating its ills – a well-earned criticism for the Party of God. However, with the party now in retreat, the many other impasses beyond it are coming into view. The first is already apparent: a block of traditional Sunni leaders, angry that Salam did not abide by any of their picks for cabinet appointments, are increasingly critical of the prime minister. This is particularly notable because these leaders should be part of Salam’s natural constituency, given that the sectarian division of senior government roles has the prime minister’s office reserved for a Sunni. Aoun similarly operates without the support of what should be the natural constituency of his office: Lebanon’s president is, by accepted convention, always a Maronite Christian, but Aoun lacks meaningful support from Lebanon’s two largest Christian parties. Parliamentarians of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) refused to vote for the new president, while those of the Lebanese Forces did so only after French officials demanded they do so. The FPM also refused to endorse the new Council of Ministers this week.

While these elites may not have sufficient sway to derail the government’s agenda on their own, each can complicate the process in different ways.

This nascent opposition portents the minefield ahead: every major policy decision by Aoun and Salam is sure to threaten the vested interests of some quarter of the Lebanese ruling elite. While these elites may not have sufficient sway to derail the government’s agenda on their own, each can complicate the process in different ways. Left unaddressed, it will not take long for these oppositional forces to collectively accumulate enough inertia to stall the reform drive.

Lebanon’s political minefield is not new. The late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri similarly sought to dramatically overhaul the country in the 1990s following Lebanon’s devasting 15-year civil war. Before he was assassinated in 2005, his tenure saw consistent blockades to his neoliberal approach to Lebanon’s reconstruction. Yet, whether one loves or loathes him, it is undeniable that he was able to force through much of his agenda. This was primarily due to the collection of catalytic forces putting wind in his sails. First was the international consensus: The United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and Syria agreed that Damascus would impose stability in Lebanon while Riyadh’s point man, Hariri, would rebuild it. The next factor was Hariri himself, an iconic Saudi-backed billionaire businessman and close confidant to former French President Jacques Chirac. With his grandeur, Hariri could most often buy off those he couldn’t bulldoze. And yet, even with his heft, Hariri’s achievements in government fell far short of his goals.

Halting Lebanon’s descent then opens the door to the next step for empowering the reform movement: the 2026 parliamentary elections.

Today, Salam, the effective head of government, has none of Hariri’s leverage. International brute force helped propel him and Aoun to office, but there is no consensus among world powers to back their reform agenda. Nor does Salam have the political clout, personal fortune or patronage networks needed to overcome the many obstacles his agenda will face.

This is not to say his tenure is destined to fail, but rather that it is incumbent on us to be realistic about what is possible in the short term: putting a floor under the economy, reinstating security across the country, and reviving the basic functions of state services. Halting Lebanon’s descent then opens the door to the next step for empowering the reform movement: the 2026 parliamentary elections.

The 2022 elections saw 13 members of parliament from the new, reform-minded Change Bloc win seats, puncturing the armor of the traditional parties that had, until then, seemed impenetrable. It was from this group that Salam’s nomination for office arose and gained momentum and international support, proving that their small presence in the legislature belies the major impact they can have. Their leverage only grows as their numbers do.

The most obvious target for continuing to gain ground from the traditional parties is breaking Hezbollah’s grip on representing the Shia community. The party’s hegemony over the Shia allocation of parliamentary seats appears vulnerable as it struggles to rebuild and replace leadership. Moreover, the dire state of the country and the renewed public thirst for meaningful change leave all of Lebanon’s traditional sectarian spheres of influence exposed.

Aoun and Salam are not miracle workers. Their government won’t dismantle decades of corruption in a single term. In place of grand victories, the focus now should be to steady the country and clear a path for deeper reforms following the 2026 elections. For now, the priority isn’t perfection—it’s progress, and that requires patience.

 

This commentary was originally published in L’Orient Today (in English) and L’Orient Le Jour (in French)

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