Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Lebanon’s War Crimes Case Against Israel

The war involves many complex legal dynamics that this paper does not address – for instance, there is much debate over whether the Israel-Hezbollah conflict constitutes an International Armed Conflict (IAC) or a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC). What this paper does show, however, is that even a cursory reading of international law statutes relative to the Israeli military’s conduct establishes ample ground for Lebanon to pursue war crimes charges. While many treaties referenced in this paper may not have been ratified or signed by Israel, this does not create a legal vacuum; Israel remains bound by customary international law, which governs the conduct of hostilities. 

Notably, in addition to the many other hurdles to achieving justice, one of the most significant steps – establishing the ICC’s jurisdiction in Lebanon – is being blocked by Lebanese leaders themselves.   

Lack of proportionality 

“Civilians are to be protected from murder, torture or brutality…” 

– ICRC Summary of Articles 13 & 32 of the 4th Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 

“Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”  

– Article 57(2)(a)(iii), Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 

Israel often asserts that its airstrikes and military operations are defensive actions aimed at neutralising Hezbollah’s military capabilities, contending that any resulting civilian casualties or property damage are unintended consequences. However, under international humanitarian law, even when military targets are legitimate, civilian casualties can constitute a war crime if the direct military advantage gained is not proportional to the civilian losses incurred.  

“Any military attack against a lawful military objective should be subject to a proportionality test,” Yousef Wehbe, IHL expert and Senior Legal Advisor at Diakonia, told Badil. This means each attack must be assessed for the anticipated definite military advantage against the potential harm to civilian life and property to ensure compliance with the principle of proportionality.  

Depending on the specific circumstance, permissible military actions would include strikes against legitimate military targets, for example warehouses storing weapons, where losses to noncombatants and their homes and businesses in the surrounding neighbourhood may be incidental. Instances that require far more scrutiny are those, for instance, that involve Hezbollah members being within a civilian building, where attacking that building would be expected to destroy it and kill all the noncombatants inside. Determining if this amounts to an IHL violation, and thus a war crime, hinges on whether the “concrete and direct military advantage” expected to be gained is significant enough to justify the deaths of everyone else and the destruction of their properties.  

On October 17, for instance, the Israeli military bombed a seven-story residential building in Ain El-Delb, outside the southern city of Sidon, killing 45 people and wounding 70. A Wall Street Journal investigation revealed that there was one member of Hezbollah living in the basement apartment who, as head of the group’s logistics committee in the nearby city, had responsibilities ranging from organising religious pilgrimages to Iran to providing security at local party events. He did not have an active military role, though he had likely received training and could have been called on as a reservist. In this instance, the killing of 45 innocent people and the wounding of 70 others seems clearly “excessive” in relation to the “direct military advantage” Israel may have expected to gain, which is little to none.  

With the Israeli military’s escalation since mid-September having pushed Lebanese civilian casualties into the thousands, examples of Israeli air strikes causing mass casualties, but without apparent military advantage, are being reported with increasing regularity. This suggests these incidents are not aberrations but that the Israeli military’s disproportional use of force is systemic policy.  

Even if we assume that Israel adheres to the principle of distinction and does not intend to target civilians, the disproportionate nature of its attacks underscores a blatant disregard for civilian safety. Even in instances when Israeli strikes served some military advantage, the dramatic increase in dead and injured civilians and widespread property destruction since mid-September raise alarms that many of these attacks may lack proportionality and must be investigated.  

Absence of Distinction

 i. The Targeting Paramedics and Journalists 

“Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians…” 

– Article 79 (1), Additional Protocol I, the Geneva Conventions 

“Civilian medical personnel shall be respected and protected.” 

– Article 15 (1), Additional Protocol I, the Geneva Conventions 

The principle of distinction in IHL broadly mandates that military attacks must be against military targets, not civilians or their property. The law establishes the rules armed forces must follow in determining whether an attack is permitted. The rapid increase in civilian casualties since the Israeli army’s mid-September escalation raises immediate concerns over whether these actions have remained within the bounds of international law. 

IHL also explicitly protects certain categories of civilians whose function may place them in the proximity of armed conflict but without direct involvement in the fighting, such as civil defence organisations (emergency responders), medical personnel, and journalists. Consequently, they are entitled to the protections afforded by the principle of civilian immunity, which prohibits targeting non-combatants. IHL provisions obligate the aggressing party to ensure their protection.  

The Israeli army has, however, killed an inordinate number of medical personnel and journalists during its attacks, with cursory examinations of several specific instances revealing what appear to be clear violations of international humanitarian law. 

In recent weeks alone, 50 paramedics were killed, bringing the total number of emergency responders killed since the start of the conflict to over 163. Among the most blatant of these attacks came in early October, when an Israeli airstrike destroyed an apartment in a Health Society building, killing seven medical and rescue workers. There was no warning prior to the attack, and the Israeli military did not offer even a pretence of a justification.   

The Israeli army also has an established policy of targeting journalists in its ongoing war on Gaza, which it appears to have extended to Lebanon. This month, an Israeli airstrike killed three journalists as they slept at a guesthouse in southeast Lebanon. They were in a compound media organisations had been using as a base to cover the conflict, with vehicles outside clearly marked with “PRESS.” Several Western news articles on the incident have included the detail that these journalists worked for media outlets affiliated with Hezbollah. This, however, is irrelevant in determining violations of IHL – journalists are protected regardless of their employer.   

The most thoroughly documented Israeli army attack on journalists in Lebanon to date occurred on October 13, 2023, when an Israeli tank fired twice from the Israeli side of the border into Lebanon, killing Reuters journalist Issam Abdallah and injuring six others. All seven were identifiable by their “PRESS” vests and had been present in the area for more than an hour and 15 minutes before the attack, while Israeli jets circled the area 25 minutes before the attack. As the Human Rights Watch investigation determined: “Israeli forces knew or should have known that the group that they were attacking were journalists.”  

These instances would appear to constitute attacks on civilians with apparent intent, thereby qualifying as war crimes.  

ii. The Bombing of Al-Qard Al-Hassan 

 “Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives.” 

– Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 

 On October 20, the Israeli army announced its intention to target buildings and offices associated with Al-Qard Al-Hassan, a registered charity in Lebanon that provides socially oriented financial services such as interest-free loans, savings accounts, and transfer and payment processing services. While affiliated with Hezbollah, it operates independently from the group’s military branch.  

The Israel army ordered evacuations of the organisation’s premises in southern Beirut, the Bekaa, and other regions, and then bombed and destroyed some 20 locations.  

The United Nations Human Rights Office condemned these attacks, stating that “under international humanitarian law, objects that contribute economically or financially to the war effort of a party to a conflict may not be lawfully made the target of attack on that basis alone, as they do not fulfil the definition of a military objective.” 

The principle of distinction under IHL mandates that if there is doubt whether “an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes…is being used to make an effective contribution to military action,” it should not be targeted, as per in Article 52 (3) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.  

What is clear is that Al-Qard Al-Hassan was an economic life for many Lebanese uninvolved in Hezbollah’s military activity. Israel simply alleging that Al-Qard Al-Hassan is involved in financing Hezbollah’s military operations does not justify bombing the organisation, as these attacks fail to meet the standard of “military objectives,” and thus the action likely constitutes a war crime.  

Ineffective Warnings

 “Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.” 

– Article 57 (2) (c), Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 

Israeli officials regularly issue blanket statements claiming their armed forces take measures to minimise civilian harm, such as issuing advanced warnings of attacks that allow for civilians to evacuate. These warnings have come in various forms, including leaflets dropped from the sky, phone calls and texts, social media posts and radio broadcasts. Under closer scrutiny, however, these efforts often appear to fall short on several fronts.  

First, there have been repeated instances of air strikes in civilian areas without warning. In other cases, when warnings have been issued, they regularly fail to meet the “effective” requirement, meaning the warnings are not issued in sufficient time or in a manner that helps genuinely ensure the safety of non-combatants. Instead, they appear to be perfunctory and aim to deflect accountability.   

In South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, Israel has regularly issued civilian evacuation orders for broad areas, such as whole cities, municipalities and districts. Furthermore, the danger zones depicted on the sporadic maps the Israeli military issues online are often inconsistent with the zones in which its spokespeople announce evacuations. This further complicates civilians’ ability to seek refuge. Amnesty International has documented instances where warnings have come late at night and less than 30 minutes before the airstrike. This provides civilians with insufficient time to evacuate, especially those unable to move quickly, such as people with health conditions.  

“Warnings that do not give civilians enough time to leave for a safer area are not considered effective,” according to Myriam Whaibe, a defence lawyer at the ICC.  

The broad evacuation orders have chaotically displaced more than one million Lebanese, particularly along the coastline. The warnings’ ambiguity has often left civilians uncertain where to seek refuge, seeding panic across numerous areas simultaneously. Consequently, many roads and highways have been gridlocked for hours as masses of the population try to escape, further exacerbating the chaos, inhibiting an effective evacuation, thereby increasing the risk of civilian harm.  

In Beirut’s southern suburbs, Israel sporadically issues more specific warnings for particular streets or buildings. This demonstrates that the Israeli military has the capacity to provide precise warnings but has chosen not to for air strikes in South Lebanon and the Bekaa region. In other instances, Israel has issued no warnings prior to bombing targets in populated areas. For example, on October 15, an Israeli airstrike destroyed a residential building in the northern Lebanese village of Aito, killing at least 22 civilians. The strike took place in a predominately Christian area, far from a centre for Hezbollah activity, with no advanced warning and no evident military target.

Use of White Phosphorus

1. “It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.”
2. “It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.”

– Article II (1&2), Protocol III, of the Convention on Conventional Weapons   

Israel has been conducting airstrikes in South Lebanon since October 8, 2023. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented that this campaign has included the use of white phosphorus. This chemical substance ignites when exposed to oxygen and is considered an incendiary weapon. It is regulated under additional Protocol III of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, to which Lebanon is a signatory and Israel is not.  

“The use of white phosphorus is not inherently prohibited but is restricted based on where and against whom it is deployed,” said Wehbe, the IHL expert from Diakonia. “While some consider it a chemical weapon, its use, especially against individuals—including military personnel—is banned.” 

The Lebanese National Council for Scientific Research reported 175 Israeli attacks using white phosphorus between October 2023 and July 2024. These were spread across 17 southern Lebanese municipalities, including five instances where airburst munitions were deployed over residential areas.   

International law bans the use of incendiary weapons against civilians and prohibits targeting military sites within populated areas using air-delivered incendiary weapons. Nehal Bhuta, a professor of public international law at the University of Edinburgh, emphasised that white phosphorus is a “weapon that causes unnecessary suffering if it’s used in a civilian context, and a weapon that can be regarded as indiscriminate if used in areas where civilians are present.” 

White phosphorus can also cause significant civilian harm through long-term population displacement. Part of this is through preventing farmers in southern Lebanon from harvesting their crops, severely impacting their livelihoods. HRW documented various instances of these munitions being fired in civilian areas, resulting in the contamination of agricultural land. Fear of lasting white phosphorus contamination also leads consumers to avoid purchasing produce from affected areas.  

The Israeli army tactic of using white phosphorus to displace populations in Gaza appears to be repeating in Lebanon, where its deployment also appears aimed at depopulating areas of the south. This raises serious concerns about compliance with IHL, given the widespread civilian harm Israel’s tactical use of white phosphorous is generating.  

For its part, Israel has contended it is deploying “primary smoke shells” which do not contain white phosphorus and that it complies with lawful means of warfare. While the threshold for deploying such shells would be lower, their use remains governed by IHL. 

Targeting UNIFIL  

“Directing an attack against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law, is prohibited.” 

– Rule 33 of Customary International Law. 

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, the international peacekeeping body station along the southern border with Israel, has reported numerous Israeli attacks on its positions in recent weeks. According to UN spokesperson Andrea Tenenti: “Since the first of October, UNIFIL has recorded over 30 incidents resulting in damage to UN property or premises or injuring to peacekeepers, about 20 of those we could attribute to IDF fire or actions, with seven being clearly deliberate.” 

These incidents include Israeli tanks and bulldozers breaking into UNIFIL bases, damaging and destroying observation watchtowers, perimeter fences, and bunkers, preventing the force from carrying out critical logistics missions, and firing a chemical agent, suspected to be white phosphorous, around a UNIFIL base, injuring 15 peacekeepers. 

“Breaching and entering a UN position is a further flagrant violation of international law and Security Council resolution 1701,” UNIFIL said in an October 13 statement, adding that, “Any deliberate attack on peacekeepers is a grave violation of international humanitarian law and resolution 1701.” 

Israeli attacks against UN peacekeepers violate multiple articles of international law. UNIFIL peacekeeping personnel are not engaged in hostilities, with Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention providing specific protections for noncombatants. Additionally, customary international law explicitly prohibits directing attacks against personnel and objects involved in peacekeeping missions. Articles 7 and 9 of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, to which Israel is not a state party to, prohibit attacks against UN personnel, equipment or premises.  

Article 8 of the Rome Statute similarly states that: “Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.” 

Israel’s claim that Hezbollah is using UNIFIL personnel and positions as “human shields” also appears to be an inversion of reality in several instances in which Israeli tanks positioned themselves within meters of peacekeepers’ positions. 

Pager and Walkie-Talkie Attacks 

” It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any booby-trap in the form of an apparently harmless portable object which is specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to detonate when it is disturbed or approached…” 

– Article 6 (1) of Protocol (II) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 

Israel remotely detonated thousands of pagers in Lebanon on September 17 and then hundreds of walkie-talkies the following day. These attacks resulted in the death of 42 people, including children, and wounded approximately 3,000 people. Hezbollah had ordered and distributed the pagers and walkie-talkies in which, during the production process, Israeli affiliates had hidden explosive charges. The concerns surrounding these attacks can be categorised into two main areas: first, their indiscriminate nature, and second, how they were executed.  

Regarding the principle of distinction – a core precept under IHL – the attacks were executed simultaneously on each of the two days, precluding the possibility for precautionary measures. There were no individual assessments to determine whether each person in possession of a pager was a legitimate military target before the devices were detonated. Additionally, in every explosion, there was the potential risk to bystanders, further raising concerns regarding the principle of distinction.  

Notably, Hezbollah, as a non-state armed group (NSAG), operates differently than other NSAGs. Hezbollah is a mixed group comprised of distinct subordinate organisations, referred to as an Organised Arm Group (OAG). The targetability of OAG members is a debated issue. The ICRC contends that in non-international armed conflicts, only individuals with a “continuous combat function” are targetable, while others can only be attacked when directly participating in hostilities. In contrast, the US asserts that all affiliates of an OAG with a conceivable combat function are targetable at any time.  

In either instance, the attacks appear to have been inherently indiscriminate, given the uncertainty over who would be holding them when Israel triggered them to explode. While it could be expected that many of the pagers would end up with individuals engaged in continuous combat functions – according to the concept adopted by the ICRC – or directly participating in hostilities at the time of triggering the explosion, it was just as likely that they would also reach those with exclusively non-combat roles, such as medical or social welfare personnel. As Myra Saade, manager of the IHL Syria Regional Desk at Diakonia, told Badil: “These attacks cannot be analysed as a bulk or as a whole.”  

These attacks were also prepared by inserting explosive components into newly manufactured or serviced pagers during production. The Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) explicitly prohibits “booby-traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material.” 

The protocol defines a booby trap as “any device or material designed, constructed, or adapted to kill or injure, which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an innocuous object or engages in an apparently safe action.” Israel’s actions, in this instance, are illegal under this framework. Moreover, despite Israel not ratifying this specific protocol, it remains bound by customary international law prohibiting such practices.  

Sonic Booms to Terrorise the Population 

“Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population, are prohibited.” 

– Article 51(2), Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions   

The fighter jets from the Israeli air force have been regularly breaking the sound barrier over Lebanese cities in the past year, creating “sonic booms” that resonate like explosions, simulating air strikes, and can shatter windows, shake buildings, and spread panic. The Lebanese National New Agency recorded at least 111 instances between October 8, 2023 and August 20 this year. Since mid-September there have been near-daily reports of sonic booms, often multiple times per day. These have also occurred throughout the country, including areas unassociated with Hezbollah.     

With the sonic booms conducted almost exclusively over civilian areas, there is no plausible military target or purpose. Without an associated military necessity or advantage, their sole function is intimidation and instilling fear in the population. This lack of a legitimate military objective likely entails that sonic booms violate jus ad bellum (the legality of using force), potentially breaching Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 

Additionally, such tactics may also violate Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II, both of which forbid violence or threats aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population. 

The Uncertain Road to Justice 

The first necessary step in holding Israel accountable for its IHL violations is very much within Lebanese control. However, the country’s leaders appear reluctant to take it. Lebanon has not ratified the Rome Statute, which presents a significant barrier to pursuing a case at the International Criminal Court. 

In April, the Lebanese government instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide the ICC jurisdiction over all crimes committed within its territory since October 7, 2023. This decision would have retroactively granted the ICC the authority to investigate these violations. Unfortunately, the Foreign Ministry failed to act on the directive, with experts speculating that Lebanese leaders had become worried about becoming defendants themselves if they granted the ICC jurisdiction in Lebanon. Instead, Lebanon lodged a complaint against Israel at the UN. This, however, is unlikely to succeed, given that it would require a Security Council resolution and the US, which has to date vetoed more than 50 resolutions proposing sanctions against Israel, would likely do so again.  

This situation underscores the legal complexities and the broader obstacles in pursuing justice. Despite the historic opportunity to hold Israel accountable for its crimes, Lebanon’s “government is simply unable or unwilling” to address the issue, “given there are other immediate priorities now and concern about hostile reaction from some Western states that protect Israel at all cost” according to Karim Makdisi, an associate professor of international politics at the American University of Beirut.  

In regards to attacks on Lebanon Israel has initiated from within its borders, there may be additional routes to seeking justice aside from the ICC. Take, for example, the attack that killed journalist Issam Abdullah in October 2023.  

“This is an attack that was launched from within Israel… [and] could be under the jurisdiction of the Commission of Inquiry on Israel and Occupied Palestine,” said Ramzi Kaiss, Lebanon researcher at Human Rights Watch. This commission, established by the UN Human Rights Council in May 2021, has jurisdiction to investigate all suspected violations of international law within the borders of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.  

Lebanon could also explore the option of lobbying the UN General Assembly to establish an international mechanism to investigate and prosecute individuals for serious violations of international law. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria (IIIM) is a precedent for such. However, Lebanon’s experience with UNGA Resolution 61/194 – which called for Israel to compensate Lebanon for damages from the 2006 war but has yet to be enforced – illustrates the limitations of relying on the General Assembly. Nonetheless, it remains essential for Lebanon to bring these violations to the international stage and create a documented record of its grievances. Such efforts could prove crucial to pursuing future opportunities for justice. 

Furthermore, Lebanon could gather and share evidence with countries that exercise universal jurisdiction, encouraging them to investigate and prosecute dual nationals involved in crimes committed in Lebanon. For instance, Belgium has recently launched an investigation into possible war crimes committed by a dual national fighting for Israel in Gaza. These efforts are consistent with the obligations of states under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law to prosecute war crimes, irrespective of where they occurred or the nationalities of those involved.  

Ultimately, the interplay of Lebanon’s internal dynamics, the international community’s double standards, and Israel’s history of non-compliance with international resolutions creates a challenging environment for achieving justice. To move forward, it is crucial for Lebanon to find the political will to pursue accountability and for the international community to uphold consistent standards in human rights enforcement. Only then can the victims of these violations hope to see the justice they deserve.